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Abstract	  
 
This thesis analyses Indonesia's foreign policy in view of role conceptions held by 
the country's policy and intellectual community and their impact on policy 
behaviour at the ASEAN level. These role conceptions capture the ways decision-
makers perceive Indonesia’s standing and influence in the region and beyond and 
include the country’s ‘independent and active’ foreign policy doctrine as well as 
widely held views of the country being a model democracy, a mediator and – 
increasingly – key actor in regional and global affairs. 
 
The research draws attention to how these notions shape Jakarta’s role in ASEAN 
Community-building and security regionalism. It focuses on a range of initiatives 
that emphasise ASEAN’s ‘liberal agenda’, including the ASEAN Charter and 
ASEAN’s approach to conflict resolution and the promotion and protection of 
human rights. In so doing, it critically reflects on Indonesia’s domestic 
performance, which stands in at times stark contrast to its agenda on the 
international stage. I argue that Indonesia’s commitment to promoting liberal 
norms and values in regional affairs is predominantly instrumental as it aims at 
consolidating ASEAN cohesion vis-à-vis the influence of external powers in order 
to advance the country’s regional leadership ambitions and desire to play a more 
active role at the global level.  
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Introduction	  
“Indonesian influence could be an overwhelmingly positive input as the world 
defines new frameworks and architecture” (Bower, 2011). 
 
Since Indonesia began its transition towards democracy in the late 1990s, the 
country has increasingly built its international profile as Jakarta aspires to exert 
more influence at the regional and global level. This transition coincided with a 
significant geopolitical shift as the United States of America reduced its presence 
in the Asia-Pacific, creating a power vacuum that was readily filled by rising 
global power China. With the recent ‘rebalancing’ of the U.S. that commenced a 
renewed focus on the Asia-Pacific Southeast Asia, and therein ASEAN, could play 
a crucial role in determining the course international relations will take in the 
Asia-Pacific in decades to come.  
 
Indonesia has always occupied a prominent place in Southeast Asian affairs. 
While Indonesia’s global advances are only starting to unfold, Jakarta has played a 
pivotal role in shaping ASEAN regionalism, increasingly so since the beginning of 
its reformasi era, which was marked by an opening of political space. In reference 
to the domestic democratisation process, Indonesia has emerged as a strong 
proponent of liberal norms and values on the regional level. Policy objectives such 
as the rule of law, good governance, civil and human rights and the liberal peace 
significantly inform the direction regional cooperation in the political and security 
spheres has taken over the past decade. Yet in the domestic sphere, these norms 
are not nearly as entrenched as Indonesia’s regional advocacy would suggest. 
What, then, are the objectives of Indonesia’s foreign policy in promoting this 
liberal agenda?  
 
The factors influencing Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda are based on several 
national role conceptions that capture the ways decision-makers perceive 
Indonesia’s standing and influence in the region and beyond. They find their 
expressions in the foreign policy discourse of the policy and intellectual elite and 
in Jakarta’s foreign policy initiatives at the ASEAN level and beyond. These role 
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conceptions refer to Indonesia’s sense of how the country can increase its 
influence as a leading middle power in regional and international affairs. 
Indonesia’s national role conceptions are alluded to frequently in national and 
international media, and they are evident in foreign policy speeches, interviews 
and analyses by domestic and international think tanks and intellectuals. A 
comprehensive overview of the range of Indonesia’s national role conceptions and 
how they inform foreign policy at the ASEAN level is thus far lacking. This thesis 
aims to address this gap to identify the main rationale for Indonesian decision-
makers as they help shape the new regional order. 
 
I argue that Indonesia’s commitment to promoting liberal norms and values in 
regional affairs is predominantly instrumental as it aims at consolidating ASEAN 
cohesion vis-à-vis the influence of external powers in order to advance the 
country’s regional leadership ambitions and desire to play a more active role at the 
global level. Indonesian leaders consider ASEAN to be an ideal vehicle in pursuit 
of this agenda. Creating a cohesive regional bloc towards an ASEAN Community 
has been on top of ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s agenda since the end of the Cold 
War and the financial crisis of the late 1990s. Shifts in the global order, from 
America’s and Japan’s relative decline to China’s and India’s rise further 
underline the need for ASEAN to find a common ground. The role of China is 
significant in this development, as Jakarta perceives Beijing as a potential threat to 
regional cohesion and to Indonesia’s sense of entitlement to regional leadership 
status. 
 
Indonesian decision-makers and leaders played a vital role in paving the way for 
major milestones of ASEAN regionalism over the past decade, such as the 
ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Political Security Community. These initiatives 
are geared towards further integrating ASEAN and institutionalising liberal norms 
and values promoted by several member countries, most notably Indonesia. 
Paradoxically, Indonesia’s own record of upholding the principles it promotes 
regionally and globally in the domestic sphere is modest at best. Human rights 
abuse and conflict is prevalent across the archipelago, putting into question 
Indonesia’s own commitment towards this liberal agenda. 
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Current shifts in the regional security environment and the disparity of Indonesia’s 
own liberal foreign policy agenda and its conduct at home suggest that for Jakarta 
the promotion of a liberal agenda is predominantly determined by a functional 
rather than an idealistic conviction which is aimed at consolidating its status as a 
regional leader and global player. An analysis of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
discourse suggests that the promotion of liberal democratic policy objectives such 
as the rule of law, good governance and the protection of human rights is seen as 
an effective means of deepening regional cooperation and creating the regional 
cohesion necessary for Indonesia to realise its leadership ambitions. Furthermore, 
this policy agenda is in accordance with the norms and values of the current 
international liberal order and thus serves Indonesia’s own efforts of projecting the 
image of a liberal democracy and model world citizen onto the global stage.  
 
This thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section I will outline 
Indonesia’s national role conceptions evident in the country’s foreign policy 
discourse. In the second section I will provide an overview of the geopolitical 
context within which foreign policy decisions are made, with a focus on the Sino-
Indonesian relationship and its implications for Indonesia’s role conception as 
regional leader. In the third section I will reflect on how Indonesia’s role 
conceptions shape Jakarta’s approach towards ASEAN regionalism, by discussing 
ASEAN’s liberal turn and policy responses towards regional security cooperation.  
 
Methodology 
This analysis draws from a review of publicly available material, including foreign 
policy speeches, official policy documents, interviews, news reports and academic 
literature discussing Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and practice. Reflecting 
on a brief review of Indonesia’s early constitutional discourse evident in the 
constitution and Pancasila, the state philosophy, as well as the writings of former 
Vice President Mohammad Hatta, I have analysed statements by several members 
of the current administration, including President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa. I have further consulted academic articles by 
some of Indonesia’s most prolific analysts, such as Rizal Sukma of the Centre for 
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Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta and Dewi Fortuna Anwar of the 
Habibie Centre.  
 
Indonesian and international news media have also provided a useful perspective 
on the role conceptions discussed in this analysis. English-language news articles 
in the Jakarta Globe and the Jakarta Post, among others, are indicative of the level 
at which role conceptions like that of the regional leader, global actor and model 
democracy translate into popular sentiments among Indonesia’s policy and 
intellectual community. I have made limited use of Indonesian-language media, as 
I found English-language media to be sufficiently resourceful and representative 
for the purpose and scope of this paper. A more in-depth analysis that takes into 
consideration the extent to which the sentiments shared by Indonesia’s policy and 
intellectual elite are reflected amongst the general public should broaden the 
research to include Indonesian-language media. I substantiated my analysis with a 
review of academic literature on Indonesian democratisation and foreign policy as 
well as third-party reports by international think tanks and non-government 
organisations. 
 
Lastly, the analysis is also based on personal observations and informal as well as 
formal conversations I have had with Indonesian officials about the changing 
political environment in Indonesia and the country’s regional and global role. I 
first visited Indonesia in 1995 and again shortly before Suharto stepped down in 
1998. I have subsequently lived in a range of professional capacities in several 
localities across the country for over three years between 2000 and 2009, including 
most recently two years as a human rights monitor in Papua province. I have not 
referred to the anecdotal evidence I have personally obtained in the following 
analysis of Indonesia’s national role conceptions and their impact on foreign 
policy. But this experience corroborates the notion that led me to formulate my 
argument. 
Indonesia’s	  National	  Role	  Conceptions	  
Jakarta’s regional promotion of the liberal norms and values that have marked the 
reformasi era in this country has elevated Indonesia among the leading democracy 
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advocates in the region. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 initiated wide-
reaching reforms of the country’s social, political and economic spheres. Free and 
fair elections, good governance, the rule of law, and the promotion and protection 
of human rights have by now arguably become well established in Indonesia’s 
domestic sphere according to a majority of foreign and domestic observers. 
Whether or not Indonesia can live up to the high standards prescribed by the 
policy changes effected through reformasi is another matter, which I will address 
in more detail below. Suffice to say that the democratic transition the country 
continues to experience considerably shapes Indonesia’s foreign policy outlook 
and its sense of standing in the regional and global order.  
 
These sentiments are captured in a range of national role conceptions, which are 
an essential feature in foreign policy-making. The concept of national role 
conceptions borrows from role theory, which has been applied to Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) since the late 1960s (Holsti, 1970, p. 236). Role theory is based on 
the notion of roles as artificial phenomena and applies “to a dynamic system of 
interacting roles, considerations of organisational and societal settings as well as 
individual personality” (Adigbuo, 2007, p. 88). The use of role theory in political 
science currently experiences a resurgence as it potentially integrates FPA and 
International Relations (IR) theory (Thies & Breuning, 2012), providing in 
particular a useful framework to analyse the foreign policy of countries in the 
South, as it offers a multidimensional framework to explain the at times 
contradictory roles of Southern states in the international system (Adigbuo, 2007).  
 
Role theory can explain the ways agents, i.e. leaders and decision-makers, interact 
with the structures of policy-making at the domestic and international level. The 
role conceptions held by these groups shape the imagination of decision-makers 
and inform the guiding principles and standards that outline a state’s foreign 
policymaking, suggesting “orientations, continuing commitments, actions, and 
functions” (Holsti, 1970, p. 306). As such, role definitions help explain continuity 
in a state’s foreign policy. There thus is a certain level of expectation, by society 
and other states, for a state to act in accordance with the roles it defines for itself in 
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the international system (Adigbuo, 2007, pp. 88-89; Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012, p. 5). 
Holsti (1970, pp. 245-246) defines a national role conception as  
 
“policy makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, 
commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the 
functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in 
the international system ... It is their image of the appropriate 
orientations and functions of their state toward, or in, the external 
environment”.  
 
Aras & Gorener (2010, p. 74) understand a national role conception to be “the core 
of a grand policy vision through which policy-makers explain the world around 
them and their state’s existence therein”. Their discussion of middle power 
Turkey’s growing regional profile between Europe and the Middle East is 
instructive in understanding Indonesia’s own role conceptions as ASEAN’s largest 
player in the dynamic geopolitical context of the Asia-Pacific. Indonesia’s foreign 
policy and intellectual elite is envisioning the country to consolidate its leadership 
role in the region and to increasingly play a global role as Indonesia becomes 
engaged in a range of issue areas and geographical contexts. Similar to Ankara, 
Jakarta’s foreign policy approach is guided by several national role conceptions, 
which are reflected in Jakarta’s foreign policy decisions as well as in its bilateral 
and multilateral relationships, and which constitute Indonesia’s ‘international 
identity’. These role conceptions are shared across the country’s foreign policy 
and academic communities. To some extent, they are also reflected in popular 
sentiments, suggesting that these role conceptions might not be solely shared by 
the elites, but might be notions that resonate with a wider public ("Indonesians 
think nation can become a superpower: Survey," 2012; Luftia, 2012c).  
 
In view of the limited scope of this paper, I will focus on the role conceptions 
shared by Indonesia’s policy and intellectual communities, rather than attempt to 
determine whether and to what extent these role conceptions are shared at a 
societal level. To determine whether and, if so, how public opinion of these role 
conceptions might further support, or inhibit Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour 
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within ASEAN and beyond would require a discourse analysis of a wide range of 
Indonesian media representing sentiments shared by major political and 
ideological communities in the country. There is already a considerable body of 
work dedicated to the analysis of change and continuity in Indonesia’s foreign 
policymaking and the interplay with domestic factors (Acharya, 1999; Anwar, 
2010a, 2010b; Bünte & Ufen, 2009; Carothers & Youngs, 2011; Clark, 2011; 
Darmosumarto, 2011; Dosch, 2006; Laksmana, 2011b; Murphy, 2012; Rüland, 
2009; Sebastian & Lanti, 2010; Sukma, 2011a, 2011b). There is thus far no 
comprehensive analysis that takes into account the range of national role 
conceptions that I will discuss in this paper and how they inform policies at the 
ASEAN level. 
 
Following Holsti’s typology of national role conceptions, we can identify several 
types that shape Indonesian foreign policy discourse and action. Before discussing 
these national role conceptions in more detail, I will briefly outline them to 
emphasise their relevance in view of the historical context of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy discourse and behaviour. Jakarta’s role conception as a regional leader and 
global actor is a principal feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and is, as 
I will argue, a determinant factor in Indonesia’s promotion of a regional liberal 
agenda and Jakarta’s approach to shaping regional security cooperation vis-à-vis 
the influence of external powers, therein China specifically. Indonesia’s foreign 
policy and intellectual community also emphasise the country’s independent and 
active foreign policy doctrine, which emphasises its non-aligned status, following 
“its own path through the various international problems” by working 
“energetically for the preservation of peace […] through endeavours supported if 
possible by the majority of the members of the United Nations” (Hatta, 1953, p. 
444). This notion also informs its role as mediator/integrator in the context of 
international and regional conflict resolution and the promotion of defence 
diplomacy. Indonesia’s policy actions towards the ASEAN Community and Asia-
Pacific-wide forums further indicate the country’s role conception as a regional 
sub-system collaborator, delineating “far-reaching commitments to cooperative 
efforts with other states to build wider communities” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265). 
Another relevant role is that of the model, or example as Indonesia seeks to 
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establish itself as a regional and global promoter of liberal democracy. The role of 
bridge, i.e. “a translator or conveyor of messages and information between peoples 
and different cultures” (Holsti, 1970, p. 266), is more multi-facetted, as it can refer 
to Indonesia’s role conception as a liberal Muslim-majority democracy and related 
foreign policy behaviour as much as it can point to Indonesia’s role conception as 
a mediator and integrator.  
 
There has been both continuity and change in Indonesia’s national role 
conceptions. In particular the dominant role conception of regional leader has 
been marked by continuity irrespective of Indonesia’s turbulent history. Also the 
role conception of mediator and related policy actions has been evident more or 
less consistently. Suharto’s close relationship with the West and frozen diplomatic 
relations with China were not always in accordance with Indonesia’s independent 
and active foreign policy doctrine. Also the roles of sub-system collaborator, 
model/example and bridge were less defined throughout the Suharto era, but have 
subsequently become more emphasised. A notable difference in Indonesia’s 
national role conception compared to Holsti’s (1970, p. 275) analysis is the 
absence, at least in the dominant foreign policy discourse, of a pronounced anti-
imperialism, which still featured prominently throughout the 1960s under the first 
president Sukarno. This sentiment continues to enjoy some popularity among the 
populace and Islamist as well as nationalist and anti-globalisation groups. It is 
barely noticeable in the dominant discourse of the country’s foreign policy and 
intellectual elite but arguably continues to inform Indonesia’s foreign 
policymaking (Clark, 2011). This dimension would be significant in an analysis of 
the role conceptions reflected in popular sentiments. 
 
Many domestic and international analysts see Indonesia’s commitment towards 
liberal democracy as a reflection of the liberal foundation of the Indonesian state 
and a return to the heydays of Indonesian internationalism (see, for example, the 
writings of Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Rizal Sukma. See also Sebastian & Lanti, 
2010). But the factors shaping Indonesia’s foreign policy are varied and more 
significantly informed by security concerns and status considerations, confirming 
Holsti’s (1970, p. 243, emphasis in original) observation that “[i]n international 
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politics […] the fact of sovereignty implies that foreign policy decisions and 
actions […] derive primarily from policymakers’ role conceptions, domestic needs 
and demands, and critical events or trends in the external environment”. The 
country was among the leading post-independence Third World actors that 
advocated for an alternative international order beyond the East – West bipolarity 
that characterised post-World War II international relations. Indonesia’s early 
nationalists envisioned the country to play an independent and active role in 
regional and global affairs. Due to the destabilising dynamics of domestic politics 
Indonesia’s foreign policy endeavours did not achieve what the nation’s founding 
leaders had envisioned, a shortcoming Jakarta’s progressive policy and intellectual 
elite now intends to remedy. 
 
The country’s foreign policy doctrine has been shaped by Indonesia’s history of 
foreign domination, anti-colonial struggle and the exposure of early nationalists to 
Western norms and values, which is reflected in the constitution and the ‘Five 
Principles’, or Pancasila. The preamble to the 1945 constitution outlines 
Indonesia’s commitment to democracy and the establishment of a world order 
based on freedom, abiding peace and social justice, to which subsequent 
amendments post-Suharto added the rule of law and human rights (Anwar, 2010b; 
Hill & Menzel, 2010).1 The purpose of the Pancasila as the philosophical 
foundation of the state was to reconcile different religious, social, ideological and 
ethnic groups (Wessel, 1994, p. 35) and “to seek fraternity among nations” (Hatta, 
1953, p. 441). It was propagated by the political elite, and widely accepted by the 
populace as reflecting cultural and moral values held in common by the numerous 
ethnic and religious communities of the country (van Bruinessen, 2002). The 
Pancasila reiterates principles already laid out in the constitution, including 
humanitarianism and democracy. Both the constitution and the Pancasila find 
their origin in modern Western democratic and humanist ideas, along with the 
influence of the world-view and ethics of traditional Java, with its emphasis on 
collectivist values and harmony of the universal order (McVey, 1996, p. 18; 
Wessel, 1994, pp. 34, 41). They serve as the framework for Indonesia’s claim to 
                                                1	   A	   1989	   translation	   of	   the	   1945	   constitution	   can	   be	   found	   online	   (accessed	   1	   February	  2013):	  www.usig.org/countryinfo/laws/indonesia/constitutionindonesia.doc.	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being a model for democracy. Today’s promotion of a liberal agenda can thus be 
said to proceed on the legacy of Indonesia’s constitutional discourse. 
 
The country’s comparably huge size in geographical and population terms as well 
as its geostrategic location between the Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, 
mainland Asia and Australia lends itself to the notion of Indonesia as a regional 
leader. During the 1950s, Jakarta’s desire to play an active role as leader, sub-
system collaborator and bridge is evident in Indonesia’s part as one of the 
founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Indonesia hosted the Asia-
Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, which led to the Movement’s formation in 
1961. The first of the ‘Ten Principles of Bandung’ affirms “respect for 
fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the charter of the 
United Nations”, a feature that continues to be popular in the country’s foreign 
policy discourse emphasising the significance of a rules- and norms-based 
international system.2 Indonesia’s commitment to the international system is 
further evident in its consistent contribution to United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations (UNPKO) since the deployment of its first Garuda contingent to Egypt 
in 1957, which underlines the country’s support for global peace and security. As I 
will discuss in more detail below, this dimension is now growing in significance as 
it substantially informs the direction regional policies on conflict resolution and 
security cooperation are taking. 
 
Indonesia’s regional leadership status and active foreign policy soon gave way to 
domestic political divisions, the implications of which would determine the 
country’s foreign policy behaviour for some time. Sukarno’s increasingly divisive 
left-leaning domestic politics, his confrontational regional advances vis-à-vis 
Malaysia and Singapore and a deteriorating economy led to ruptures in the 
domestic political sphere that facilitated Suharto’s rise to power in 1967. The 
formation of ASEAN and Indonesia’s support of the grouping was as much 
devised as an anti-Communist bloc, as it was aimed at affirming Indonesia’s 
                                                2	   ‘Ten	  Principles	  of	  Bandung	   (Dasa	  Sila	  Bandung)’,	  The	  Asian-­‐African	  Conference,	  Bandung,	  18-­‐24	  April	  1955.	  Online	  (accessed	  24	  January	  2013):	  http://docenti.unimc.it/docenti/uoldelul-­‐chelati-­‐dirar/2009/storia-­‐delle-­‐relazioni-­‐internazionali-­‐2009/i-­‐dieci-­‐punti-­‐della-­‐conferenza-­‐di-­‐bandung/at_download/file.	   See	   also	  Hatta	  (1953,	  p.	  441).	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abandonment of konfrontasi (Acharya, 2000b, p. 84; Clark, 2011; Severino, 2006, 
p. 7). 
  
Suharto focused on strengthening the country’s economy and on stabilising the 
socio-political sphere, while Indonesia’s foreign policy profile remained less 
pronounced throughout the dictatorship. Jakarta’s notable engagements in regional 
security affairs during Suharto’s administration include Indonesia’s role in the 
Cambodian intervention in the 1990s and its facilitation of a peace settlement 
between the Philippine government and the Moro National Liberation Front in 
1996. The integration of Southeast Asian economies that produced the ‘Asian 
miracle’ helped entrench Suharto’s authoritarian rule, further aided by the West’s 
tacit support in view of Cold War strategic considerations and economic 
opportunities. Suharto’s Western-oriented economic development agenda raised 
the country among the new Tigers in the 1990s, before the Asian financial crisis 
brought to an end not only Indonesia’s economic ‘miracle’, but also Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime.  
 
The repercussions of the financial crisis initiated a complete overhaul of 
Indonesia’s political system, which brought with it the introduction of a wide 
range of reforms in political, economic, and social spheres. The prominent civil 
and political human rights discourse that has marked this era had already taken 
shape in the early 1990s. It originated from growing domestic and transnational 
networks as well as regional developments that increased pressure on the Suharto 
regime and effected, among others, the establishment of the Indonesian National 
Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) in 1993, the second such body in 
Southeast Asia (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 111; Jetschke, 1999, p. 156ff).3 The 
country’s dynamic civil society as well as a surge in the number of political parties 
greatly increased the number of voices in the domestic political decision-making 
process. This played a pivotal role in advancing democratisation, with a ‘spill-
over’ effect on the country’s foreign policy agenda.  
 
                                                3	  The	  first	  such	  body	  was	  instituted	  in	  the	  Philippines	  in	  1987.	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I will now turn to the different national role conceptions that are reflected in 
Indonesia’s current foreign policy discourse and that refer back to the 
constitutional and early nationalist discourse discussed above. It should be noted 
that these role conceptions cannot always be clearly differentiated, as some major 
themes permeate several of the types discussed below. Indonesia’s foreign policy 
doctrine of independent and active is a common theme that applies to all role 
conceptions. The roles of Indonesia as a leading middle power, a model 
democracy, a bridge and a mediator and integrator in regional and international 
affairs are recurring notions in the international identity Indonesia intends to 
project. I will attempt to analyse these types in accordance with Holsti’s (1970) 
typology. 
Example/Model	  
The transformation to democracy after Suharto’s downfall was comparably swift, 
and Indonesian politicians and intellectuals consider the country as primus inter 
pares, or the first among equals, in ASEAN for having successfully managed this 
process and for its leading role in the Association (Al-Anshori, 2012; Anwar, 
2010c; Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 165; Sari, 2011, p. 8). Indonesia’s image as a 
stable and liberal democracy is a significant asset, which serves to project its status 
as a responsible member of the international community and advance its ambitions 
of exerting a higher level of influence on global affairs, returning to the Sukarno-
style internationalist, or ‘lighthouse’, foreign policy as the global spokesperson for 
countries in the South (Acharya, 2000b, pp. 50-51; Anwar, 2010c; Laksmana, 
2011b, p. 162; Sukma, 2011c). Indonesia has consolidated this image by 
promoting the norms and values of liberal democracy at the regional level, or, as 
some argue, by pursuing a ‘cosmopolitan’ foreign policy (Murphy, 2012, p. 86).4 
Indonesia’s “normative and moral authority” (Laksmana, 2011b, p. 159), its 
promotion of human rights, democracy and the liberal peace are among the pillars 
                                                4	  Acharya	  (2009,	  p.	  9-­‐11)	  questions	  the	  norms	  discourse	  of	  ‘moral	  cosmopolitanism’,	  arguing	  that	   the	   process	   of	   diffusion	   is	   one-­‐way	   and	   exogenous,	   rather	   than	   the	   local	   agency-­‐led	  congruence	  proposed	  by	  the	  author.	  In	  moral	  cosmopolitanism,	  moreover,	  ‘Western	  and	  non-­‐Western	   beliefs	   and	   practices	   tend	   to	   be	   dichotomized	   into	   good	   vs.	   bad	   norms.	   The	  Indonesian	  example	  is	  intriguing,	  as	  what	  could	  be	  considered	  cosmopolitan	  norms	  also	  find	  their	   expression	   in	   Javanese	   ethics	   and	   values	   which,	   as	   I	   discussed	   above,	   blended	   with	  Western	  liberal	  ideas	  to	  inform	  Indonesia’s	  unique	  constitutional	  discourse.	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of its outward-looking foreign policy agenda at the ASEAN level and beyond 
(Anwar, 2010b, p. 132; Laksmana, 2011b; Sukma, 2011a).  
 
The constitutional discourse provides the normative standard that has influenced 
Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour since the country set out on its path of 
democratisation post-Suharto. Sebastian and Lanti (2010, p. 149) thus consider the 
prominence of Indonesia’s liberal discourse a reawakening of “primordial 
sentiments”. Subsequent to the turmoil of the post-crisis years and the breakdown 
of the New Order regime, “[s]pearheading the democracy drive in ASEAN was 
[…] regarded by the Indonesian political elite as a noble cause legitimizing 
renewed claims to regional leadership” (Rüland, 2009, p. 397; see also Sukma, 
2011c, p. 112). The perception that Indonesia as “the most democratic country in 
ASEAN” should take the lead in promoting democratic values is held across 
Indonesian state and non-state actors alike, including high officials (Dosch, 2008, 
p. 537). Indonesia’s democratic credentials also inform its image as a political 
model that successfully blends Muslim and democratic sensibilities, evident in the 
national role conception of the bridge. 
Bridge	  
The country’s arguably successful democratization and its credentials as the 
world’s third largest democracy with the world’s largest Muslim majority are seen 
to project Indonesia’s image as a bridge between the Muslim world and the West 
(Anwar, 2010b, p. 132; Hitipeuw, 2011; Murphy, 2012, p. 96) and within Islam 
itself as Indonesia’s Islam is branded as “a force for peace, tolerance and 
harmony” (Sukma, 2011a). Yet despite Indonesia’s membership in the 
Organisation of Islamic Conference and several peace initiatives in the Middle 
East, such as capacity-building in Palestine and Afghanistan and the hosting of the 
2007 Sunni-Shiite Conference in Bogor, the government refrains from capitalising 
on a Muslim identity in conceptualising the country’s regional and, moreover, 
global role as a bridge between cultures and religions. Initiatives in the Middle 
East that got underway in the early years of the Yudhoyono administration 
received a lukewarm response. The country’s desire to be a bridge between Islam 
and the West is yet to be realised (Anwar, 2010a) and Indonesia’s success in 
affecting normative shifts in the Arab world has thus far been modest at best 
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(Cullum, 2010; Greenlees, 2007; Rüland, 2009, p. 397; Sukma, 2011a). This led 
Greg Fealy (cited in Greenlees, 2007) of the Australian National University to 
declare that “there is a huge gap between Indonesia’s rhetoric and aspirations, and 
what is achieved”, a view shared by Rizal Sukma of Jakarta’s Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies (Sukma, 2011b).  
 
Jakarta’s hesitation to play the Muslim card too prolifically is also due to the fact 
that despite the increasingly defined Muslim identity domestically, the country is 
perceived by many Arab nations to lack religious authority (Greenlees, 2007; 
"Indonesia: Muslim bridge-builder?," 2008). This is due to the comparably 
moderate and syncretistic form of Islam, influenced by the historical traits of 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Javanese mysticism, which is practiced by a majority of 
the country’s nominal Muslims. Also because of this cultural and religious 
pluralism, Indonesia’s history has been characterised by secularist politics, and 
“despite santrification or reislamization, Islam in the largest muslim [sic] country 
does not translate into a powerful political force” (Raillon, 2004, p. 5), both in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour and in the domestic sphere (Priamarizki, 
2013). But the notion of Indonesia as a bridge also permeates other role 
conceptions. 
 
The role conception of bridge also lends itself to the popular historical notion of 
Indonesia as a country “steering between two reefs”, as Jakarta is advancing 
regional cooperation with global powers U.S. and China. The notion was coined 
by one of the country’s foremost intellectuals and, with Sukarno, celebrated 
founding fathers, former Vice President Mohammad Hatta, and alludes to 
Indonesia’s independent and active role between Cold War superpowers America 
and Russia (Hatta, 1948, 1958). This role conception was later accentuated 
through Indonesia’s commitment to the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, with 
the end of the Cold War, the challenges faced by Indonesia and other regional 
governments appear to be more complex, increasingly requiring transnational and 
cooperative or collaborative responses. Referring to traditional and non-traditional 
security (NTS) challenges of a multi-polar world order, Indonesia’s Foreign 
Minister, Marty Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010), said  
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“our orientation now is to ensure that for every one of these issues, we 
are part of the solution. In other words, we are about building bridges. 
We are not interested in accentuating differences”.  
 
The role conception of bridge thus also refers to Indonesia’s foreign policy 
agenda of advancing multilateralism and conflict resolution. These 
objectives are further accentuated in the role types of regional sub-system 
collaborator and mediator/integrator. 
Regional	  Sub-­System	  Collaborator	  
As a country straddling a geographical, political and socio-cultural crossroads, 
Indonesia perceives itself to occupy a prominent position as a facilitator of 
cooperative and collaborative efforts and dialogue, thus pursuing “all-embracing 
policies in regional matters, with a goal of constructing a new regional order” 
(Aras & Gorener, 2010, p. 83). This role conception serves to rationalise 
Indonesia’s engagement in a range of issue areas in multiple settings, including in 
the Middle East and closer to home, in the Asia-Pacific, where the country’s 
foreign policy approach extends to “far-reaching commitments to cooperative 
efforts with other states to build wider communities” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265) 
towards an ASEAN Community.  
 
Indonesian leaders refer to the country’s role in maintaining and supporting the 
global order and its norms and rules-based system, highlighting ‘an order 
instituting role’ (Aras & Gorener, 2010, p. 83). At the 2012 Ministerial Meeting of 
the Non-Aligned Movement in Tehran, Natalegawa (cited in "Indonesia pushes for 
multilateral peace at Non-Aligned Movement meeting," 2012) called member 
countries to  
 
“invest in strengthening multilateral diplomacy to create a global 
culture of peace and security. The United Nations is the primary 
vehicle for promoting global peace and security”.  
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As such, this role conception would extend to that of a ‘global sub-system 
collaborator’ (Aras & Gorener, 2010, p. 84). Indonesian President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to peace and diplomacy when he 
said that Indonesia has “a million friends and zero enemies” in the inaugural 
speech for his second term in office ("SBY: Indonesia has 'A Million Friends and 
Zero Enemies'," 2009). This notion was later dubbed “‘a million friends’ 
diplomacy” in a Jakarta Post opinion piece (Pramono, 2010).  
 
Most significantly, this role conception is evident in the policy initiatives Jakarta 
has been promoting at the ASEAN level, where Indonesia aims to fulfil the role of 
“the anchor of unity of ASEAN” (Syailendra, 2013). This endeavour is evident in 
the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Political Security Community,5 which I will 
discuss in detail below. It is demonstrated by Jakarta’s commitment to institute a 
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea between ASEAN and China, which 
Indonesia has been pursuing for several years ("Discourse: Marty lays out foreign 
policy priorities for 2013," 2012). It is further evident in Indonesia’s growing 
commitment to defence diplomacy and conflict resolution initiatives around the 
world, which I will also address in section three. President Yudhoyono depicted 
this foreign policy doctrine of a ‘dynamic equilibrium’ as “[a] regional 
architecture where no single power predominates, and every nation is in a win-win 
relationship with all others”.6 This role further relates to that of the mediator, a 
prominent image frequently alluded to by Indonesia’s policy and intellectual elite. 
Mediator/Integrator	  	  
The mediator/integrator role type refers to the perception “of a continuing task to 
help adversaries reconcile their differences” (Holsti, 1970, p. 265). Indonesia’s 
                                                5	   In	   the	   literature	   the	   initiative	   is	   interchangeably	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   ASEAN	   Security	  Community,	   reflecting	   the	   original	   Indonesian	   proposal,	   and	   the	   ASEAN	   Political	   Security	  Community,	   reflecting	   the	   subsequent	   adoption	   by	   ASEAN	   leaders.	   In	   the	   following	   I	   will	  refer	  to	  the	  ASEAN	  Political	  Security	  Community	  (APSC).	  The	  other	  two	  pillars	  of	  the	  ASEAN	  Community	  are	  the	  ASEAN	  Economic	  Community	  and	  the	  ASEAN	  Socio-­‐Cultural	  Community.	  Roadmap	  for	  an	  ASEAN	  Community	  2009-­‐2015,	  online:	  www.aseansec.org/publications/RoadmapASEANCommunity.pdf.	  6	  “Fighting	  for	  peace,	  justice	  and	  prosperity	  in	  the	  21st	  Century”,	  Inaugural	  Address	  by	  H.E.	  Dr.	  Susilo	   Bambang	   Yudhoyono	   at	   the	   opening	   session	   of	   the	   16th	   Ministerial	   Conference	   and	  Commemorative	   Meeting	   of	   the	   50th	   Anniversary	   of	   the	   Non-­‐Aligned	   Movement,	   25	   May	  2011,	   Bali,	   Indonesia,	   p.5.	   Online	   (accessed	   24	   January	   2013):	   www.nam-­‐indonesia.kemlu.go.id/images/AAA/inaugural_address_by_h.e._dr._susilo_bambang_yudhoyono.pdf.	  See	  also	  (Darmosumarto,	  2011,	  p.	  166).	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engagement as a  ‘problem-solver’ and a mediator is grounded in the country’s 
constitutional discourse promoting ‘freedom, eternal peace, and social justice’ 
(Agensky & Barker, 2012, p. 116; Murphy, 2012, p. 96; Rüland, 2009). President 
Yudhoyono, in his Independence Day Speech on 16 August 2012, repeatedly 
alluded to the country’s constitutional commitments to international peace and 
order and the tradition of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy 
doctrine.7 He further reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to peace and justice in 
his inaugural speech to the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Bali in 
2011.8 Also Foreign Minister Natalegawa highlights Jakarta’s recent initiatives as 
a return to the early values of Indonesian internationalism (Cullum, 2010). This 
presents a continuum, which reflects on the writings of Mohammad Hatta, whose 
philosophy was deeply influenced by the ideas of the democratic peace. 
Indonesia’s first line of defence, as Hatta pointed out, is “the achievement of a 
stable peace and a good understanding with our neighbours” (Hatta, 1956, p. 424). 
On Indonesia’s credibility as a mediator, Marty Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 
2010) pointed out that 
 
“Indonesia is naturally a consensus builder because that's the makeup 
of our own country. We are […] a very diverse country made up of 
hundreds of different ethnic groups, hundreds of languages spoken. So 
consensus building comes naturally to Indonesia […] this is one 
quality that Indonesia is now trying to propagate, trying to project in 
international affairs. Whether it be on climate change, whether it be on 
disarmament issues, development issues, we always try to be part of 
the solution to many of our contemporary issues” 
 
Natalegawa continues to say that “Indonesia has been a country that other ASEAN 
countries turn to whenever they have some bilateral problems or challenges” (cited 
in Cullum, 2010). He noted that, for example, in view of the South China Sea 
                                                7	   Pidato	   Kenegaraan	   Presiden	   Republik	   Indonesia	   dalam	   Rangka	   HUT	   ke-­‐67	   Proklamasi	  Kemerdekaan	   Republik	   Indonesia	   di	   depan	   Sidang	   Bersama	   Dewan	   Perwakilan	   Rakyat	  Republik	   Indonesia	  dan	  Dewan	  Perwakilan	  Daerah	  Republik	   Indonesia,	   Jakarta,	  16	  Agustus	  2012.	  Online	  (accessed	  28	  January	  2013):	  www.presidensby.info/index.php/pidato/2012/08/16/1930.html	  	  8	  “Fighting	  for	  peace,	  justice	  and	  prosperity	  in	  the	  21st	  Century”.	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dispute that shook the at times fragile unity of the Association in 2012 and the 
attempts of the United States and China to assert their roles in the region, 
Indonesia remained an important mediating force and a source for solution to 
regional challenges ("Discourse: Marty lays out foreign policy priorities for 2013," 
2012; Sagita, 2013). Promoting diplomatic initiatives and solutions is a key feature 
of projecting the nature of “Indonesia’s benign rise” and the country’s role as “a 
positive force for regional peace” (Syailendra, 2012) and “a credible force of 
moderation” (Anwar, 2010c). Indonesia furthers this image as ‘problem solver’ in 
ASEAN through its commitment to finding a solution to the ethnic conflict in 
Western Burma, the border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia and its long-
time engagement with peace processes in the Southern Philippines. Jakarta also 
projects this image beyond the region. In the Middle East, Indonesia facilitated 
talks between Iraqi Sunni and Shiite groups and has been a significant contributor 
to the UN’s peacekeeping force in Lebanon. According to former Foreign Minister 
Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia can “produce some fresh ideas that might be helpful 
in the quest for a solution” (cited in Greenlees, 2007). The country’s continued and 
increasing participation in UNPKO, which I will discuss in more detail below, 
highlights this endeavour. 
 
These initiatives serve to project the country’s image as a responsible international 
actor in the wider region. Sebastian and Lanti (2010, p. 168) suggest Indonesia 
thus has a sense of playing a dignified central role in regional and global politics 
(see also Sukma, 2009a). Members of Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual 
community also highlight the fact that Indonesia is increasingly capitalizing on the 
country’s “soft power”, based on the claim of having successfully democratised its 
domestic political space (Hitipeuw, 2011; Laksmana, 2011b, p. 159). This is 
meant to underline Jakarta’s benign intentions in the region. This and other role 
types discussed above are meant to add to Indonesia’s credentials as a regional 
leader and global actor. 
Regional	  leader	  and	  Global	  Actor	  
Indonesia’s national role conception as a regional leader and global actor is the 
most dominant role type evident in Indonesia’s foreign policy discourse and is 
substantiated by the variety of other role types discussed above. The Indonesian 
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foreign policy and intellectual community perceives Indonesia as the natural 
leader of the ASEAN region (Al-Anshori, 2012; Bayuni, 2012; Cullum, 2010; 
Sagita, 2013; Syailendra, 2012), with its secretariat symbolically located in the 
Indonesian capital. Indonesia thus has a sense of entitlement to assume a bigger 
international role (Bandoro, 2008; Drysdale, 2011; "Indonesians think nation can 
become a superpower: Survey," 2012; Laksmana, 2011b; Murphy, 2012; Rüland, 
2009, p. 397). Taking a leadership role in transnational issues is at the heart of 
Indonesia’s foreign policy and Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa thus considers 
the assertion of Indonesia’s regional leadership status one of the priorities for 2013 
(Sagita, 2013). Democracy promotion has emerged as a major foreign policy 
rallying point (Dosch, 2008, p. 537). The country’s promotion of a liberal agenda 
makes it a natural close partner of the West and adds weight to the ‘international 
identity’9 Indonesia intends to convey as a country where Islam, democracy and 
modernisation go hand in hand (Agensky & Barker, 2012; Anwar, 2010a, 2010b; 
Clark, 2011; Katsumata, 2009; Sukma, 2011c, p. 112).  
 
The perception that “Indonesia is […] one of the most under-estimated countries 
in Asia” also drives the agenda of consolidating its leadership status (Drysdale, 
2011).10 As I had mentioned above, Indonesia’s early nationalists had envisioned 
the country to play a leading role internationally, an ambition that was never quite 
realised in the course of Indonesia’s turbulent history. Joining ASEAN was also 
rationalised with the notion that the grouping could potentially “serve as a forum 
for the expression of Indonesia’s leadership in Southeast Asia” (Weinstein, 1969, 
in Acharya, 2000b, p. 84). With the country’s comparably successful rise from 
what many observers feared to be the looming disintegration after more than three 
decades of authoritarian rule and subsequent turmoil, Jakarta’s foreign policy 
community again envisions Indonesia to become an influential regional and global 
player. After Habibie’s and Wahid’s efforts of managing and containing the 
economic, political and social crises of the post-Suharto years, the Megawati 
administration projected Indonesia’s leadership claims onto the regional stage by 
taking the lead in regional initiatives. Milestones during the Megawati 
                                                9	  Indonesian	  President	  Susilo	  Bambang	  Yudhoyono	  in	  his	  first	  foreign	  policy	  speech	  in	  2005	  (cited	  in	  Anwar,	  2010b,	  p.	  131).	  See	  also	  Sukma	  (2011c).	  10	  See	  also	  Anwar	  (2010c).	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administration were developments towards the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN 
Community, which helped entrench Indonesia’s policy objectives at the regional 
level. This process was further advanced by the Yudhoyono administration, which 
also elevated Indonesia back onto the global stage by showing Jakarta’s 
commitment to a range of transnational issues in the security, economic, civil and 
environmental spheres (Acharya, 2007; Agensky & Barker, 2012; Clark, 2011; 
Murphy, 2010).  
 
Indonesia’s international role in democracy promotion, conflict resolution, climate 
change and economic development has attracted much international praise, and 
Indonesians take great pride in their country’s growing international status, 
exemplified also by Indonesia’s membership in the G20, where Jakarta intends to 
be a spokesperson for countries in the South to change the global economic order 
in their favour (Anwar, 2010c; Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 166; Koesoemawiria, 
2011; Sukma, 2011c; Suratin, 2012). Additionally, since 9/11 and the activities of 
domestic as well as regional terror groups, Indonesia became a key actor in the 
‘war on terror’, and has battled home-grown terrorism with arguable success, in 
spite of some resentment from increasingly politicised Islamist forces in 
Indonesian society advocating anti-American sentiments (Agensky & Barker, 
2012; Laksmana, 2011b; Murphy, 2010). These achievements have strengthened 
the confidence of Indonesia’s foreign policy elite, advancing their ambition to see 
the country assume a leading role internationally.  
 
Thus far, Indonesia’s international profile is relatively modest, but Jakarta’s role in 
ASEAN and beyond clearly illustrates this level of confidence. Indonesia’s global 
impact, it has been argued, will only be effective if Jakarta can take the lead within 
Southeast Asia (Bower, 2011). ASEAN is perceived as the ideal vehicle to realise 
Indonesia’s global ambitions. Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) thus asserts  
 
“certainly a foothold in ASEAN is a prerequisite for a role elsewhere 
[…] Indonesia's role in ASEAN – when we chair ASEAN, for example 
– it's about exercising leadership”. 
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Most notable is Indonesia’s role in advancing and shaping security multilateralism 
in the Asia-Pacific, evident in Jakarta’s leading role in ASEAN security 
regionalism and defence diplomacy. This dimension also underlines Jakarta’s 
concerns over China’s rise and the resulting threat perception to its regional 
leadership status, which I will address in detail in the following section. When 
ASEAN governments discussed the inclusion of external powers in the East Asia 
Summit, for instance, Indonesia insisted on including the U.S., Australia, India and 
other external powers, whereas Malaysia favoured the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
configuration with China, Japan and South Korea. Indonesia succeeded in the end 
and Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) pointed out that 
 
“we have been having a rather lengthy debate on what is called 
regional architecture building. And Indonesia has really weighed in on 
this debate and tried to take a leadership position”.  
 
Whether Indonesia leads as the political heavyweight of Southeast Asia in regional 
policy decisions, as a model democracy to be emulated by ASEAN members and 
nascent democracies beyond the region or as a mediator/integrator in Asia-Pacific 
multilateralism and supporter of the liberal peace globally, the role conception of 
‘leader’ is a recurring theme that permeates other role conceptions. The 
government’s foreign policy objectives at the ASEAN level and beyond are 
intricately linked with role types discussed above and substantially inform 
Jakarta’s foreign policy agenda. Jakarta aims to apply the democratic credentials it 
has established in the domestic sphere to the region and beyond as Indonesia’s 
foreign policy elite sees Indonesia play a leading role in numerous geographic and 
issue areas, most notably in ASEAN. This has led some observers to argue that 
Indonesia’s democratisation is informed by a neo-nationalist agenda among 
Indonesia’s legislature that likely determines not only the nature of Indonesia’s 
rise, but further the way it is perceived by Indonesia’s regional neighbours 
(Jetschke, 1999; Rüland, 2009). Indonesia’s leadership ambitions have caused 
some concern in the region. Moreover, other ASEAN governments question 
Indonesia’s own commitment to its liberal agenda, due to the country’s 
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questionable performance in implementing its liberal agenda in the domestic 
sphere. 
Regional	  Rhetoric	  vs.	  Domestic	  Action	  
The discrepancies between Indonesia’s regional rhetoric and the domestic reality 
raise the question as to Jakarta’s rationale for promoting the norms and values of a 
liberal democratic order at the ASEAN level. The role conceptions of model 
democracy, bridge and mediator that the country conveys regionally and globally 
are not as apparent in the domestic sphere. Yet Jakarta’s promotion of a liberal 
agenda in the region and internationally has been instrumental in facilitating 
Indonesia’s rise to regional leadership, despite the concerns it caused among other 
ASEAN members. Several of the country’s ASEAN neighbours are concerned 
about Jakarta’s leadership ambitions and see the region’s norms of sovereignty and 
non-interference in the member states’ internal affairs threatened by Indonesia’s 
regional policy initiatives (Anwar, 2010b; Jones, 2010; Rüland, 2009, p. 379). 
Officials in Malaysia and Singapore, for example, consider Indonesia’s democracy 
agenda “a recipe for creating societal disorder” (Rüland, 2009, p. 398). Some 
analysts go so far as to suggest “Jakarta really does not care if ASEAN lives or 
dies” (Loveard, cited in Hunt, 2012). Jakarta has been accused of ‘bullying’ other 
members into taking unpopular decisions towards further democratisation, a 
sentiment that has not escaped Indonesian leaders (Emmers, 2005; Rüland, 2009, 
pp. 385, 387). According to Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010)   
 
“given Indonesia's status, it size, obvious size, population-wise, 
geographic-wise, we cannot exercise leadership by – in forcing 
ourselves. It has to be an earned leadership”.  
 
It is this notion of ‘earned leadership’ that is subject to scrutiny from domestic and 
external observers, as Jakarta’s regional objectives are not always reflected in the 
domestic sphere. Critics question the ‘liberal image’ Indonesia aims to convey, as 
it contradicts the prevalence of corruption and of authoritarian and oligarchic 
elements in Indonesian society, as well as the authorities’ poor performance in 
protecting civil and human rights domestically (Anwar, 2010c; Sukma, 2011c). 
The quality and depth of Indonesia’s democracy has been questioned repeatedly, 
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with references made to Indonesia being a ‘pseudo democracy’ (Case, 2002), an 
‘illiberal democracy’ (Hadiz, 2004), a ‘patrimonial democracy’ (Webber, 2006), a 
‘messy democracy’ (Anwar, 2010b, p. 135), and a ‘hybrid regime’ (Bünte & Ufen, 
2009), referring to the grey-zone between electoral and liberal democracy that 
includes both democratic and authoritarian elements.  
 
Despite one and a half decades of advancing democratisation, decentralisation and 
liberalisation of the economic and political spheres, Indonesia has also 
experienced numerous setbacks that increasingly attract regional and international 
attention and criticism. The prevalence of corruption, weak law enforcement, 
communal tensions and continuing incidents of extremism continue to blemish 
Indonesia’s image (Human Rights Watch, 2013, p. 323ff; Sukma, 2011a; 
Weatherbee, 2011). The conflict in Aceh often serves as prime example of 
Indonesia’s commitment to solving domestic conflicts. Yet at the same time as the 
Megawati administration advanced Indonesia’s liberal agenda at the ASEAN level 
in 2003 with proposals for establishing a regional human rights body and a 
regional peacekeeping force, Jakarta declared martial law in Aceh. Had it not been 
for the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami it is questionable whether Jakarta (and the Free 
Aceh Movement) would have demonstrated as much political will to resolve the 
conflict as they did after the disaster struck. 
 
The ongoing conflict in the Papuan provinces in particular provides a perspective 
on Indonesia’s failure to protect human rights domestically that stands in stark 
contrast to the image Jakarta aims to project internationally. Several foreign 
governments and international non-government organisations raised concerns with 
the Indonesian government throughout 2012 over incidents of human rights abuse 
in Papua along with ongoing impunity and lack of accountability of the security 
forces in Papua and beyond (Amnesty International, 2012; "Australia presses 
Indonesia on Papua killing," 2012; "Clinton urges dialogue in Indonesia's Papua," 
2012; "Government urged to act on Papuan death squad claims," 2012; Human 
Rights Watch, 2012; 2013, p. 324; International Crisis Group, 2012). The violent 
conduct of security forces continues unabated as hardliners in Jakarta support 
further militarisation in order to subdue secessionist sentiments ("House bangs 
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drum of war in Papua," 2012), a trend underpinned by changes to cooperation 
among security forces that potentially strengthen the military’s role in managing 
internal conflicts (Poling & Magpile, 2013). In a paradoxical sense Indonesia’s 
international profile as a promoter of democracy and human rights appears to 
allow Jakarta to evade increased international scrutiny of its security approach to 
the Papuan provinces, it’s overall international image thus far hardly tarnished by 
the ongoing injustices there. 
  
Alongside conflicts over historical grievances, land and resources, religious 
tensions are also on the rise. Incidents of religious intolerance in Indonesia 
doubled between 2007 and 2012 according to a report by the Jakarta-based Setara 
Institute for Democracy and Peace (Setara Institute, 2012; Timur, 2012). Also the 
Wahid Institute concluded that religiously motivated attacks and intolerance rose 
by 50% between 2009 and 2010 ("Feet of clay: Indonesia and its place in the 
world," 2011). A radical Muslim minority has gained notorious prominence in the 
country. Christian minorities have been targeted on occasion since the end of the 
Suharto regime. But the Ahmadiya and the Shiite communities, two Muslim 
minorities in the Sunni-dominated country, are also increasingly targeted and 
attacked by Sunni Muslim mobs ("Feet of clay: Indonesia and its place in the 
world," 2011). Significantly, attacks on the freedom of religion are not limited to 
rioting mobs but at times receive tacit as well as explicit support from authorities. 
Security forces stood by attacks on minority groups and government officials 
issued discriminatory policies, such as passing a decree banning Ahmadis from 
proselytising or worshipping in public, and high officials made statements that 
increased tensions, including Religious Affairs Minister Suryadharma Ali ("Feet 
of clay: Indonesia and its place in the world," 2011; Human Rights Watch, 2013, 
p. 324; Setara Institute, 2012).  
 
The country’s failure to protect human rights in the domestic realm reflects the 
tensions within Indonesia’s political and social sphere, where liberal forces 
oftentimes clash with an rising political Islam, a growing nationalism and the 
legacy of military and authoritarian rule (Sukma, 2011a). Rüland (2009, p. 399) 
refers to “the gap between the old (authoritarian, power and sovereignty-based) 
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norms and the new (liberal) norms” that pull the country’s political development 
into different directions. This paradox is also evident in Indonesia’s foreign policy. 
Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2010c) suggests that “[t]he push and pull between a 
Sukarno-style ‘lighthouse’ international stance and a more pragmatic, 
economically-focused effort will likely mark the course of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy in the years ahead”. More significant still is the role geopolitical 
considerations play in Indonesia’s foreign policy agenda. While Indonesia’s 
idealist foundations are a useful historical legacy upon which to rationalise 
Jakarta’s liberal agenda in ASEAN, the motivations behind its recent liberalisation 
policies are more functional.  
 
Indonesia aims at advancing regional cohesion through the promotion of a liberal 
agenda, as Jakarta intends to consolidate its regional leadership status vis-à-vis the 
growing influence of external powers. China’s rise plays a central role in 
determining Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation as Beijing’s influence in 
Southeast Asia grows. Following a discussion of the geopolitical context and the 
implications of the Sino-Indonesian relationship for Indonesia’s foreign policy 
behaviour in section two, I will analyse to what extent Indonesia’s role 
conceptions are reflected in policy initiatives at the regional level in section three. 
The	  Geopolitical	  Context	  
The Asia-Pacific region is emerging as the focus of 21st century international 
relations. The region contains a large share of the world’s population, strong and 
emerging economies along with some of the world’s most important trade centres 
and shipping routes, a vast array of natural resources and a kaleidoscope of 
peoples and cultures, co-existing mostly peacefully, though with prevalent and 
latent conflicts as a source of potential regional and global instability. ASEAN is 
one of the region’s central bodies and its performance and future relevance as a 
regional institution have been subject to a long and on-going debate (Amador, 
2010; Anwar, 2010b; Beeson, 2003; Jones, 2010; Khoo, 2004; Kurlantzick, 2012; 
Leifer, 1973; Rüland & Jetschke, 2008). Its impact on the regional order since its 
inception in 1967, however, has without a doubt been a fundamental feature of 
international relations in the Asia-Pacific.  
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ASEAN has undergone significant changes over the past two decades. With 
increased membership, a changing regional and global order, and the 
acknowledgement that a range of economic, environmental, political and security 
challenges affecting the wider region require a concerted response, the Association 
has taken steps towards closer cooperation, with the goal of creating an ASEAN 
Community by 2015 to consolidate ASEAN’s centrality in regional affairs. 
ASEAN now plays a key role in a range of high-profile international forums, such 
as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), all of which further engage a range of 
external powers, including the U.S. and China. Alongside advancing multilateral 
dialogue on political, economic and security aspects, engaging the U.S. and China 
also serves to contain their mutual rivalry and dominance over weaker regional 
states (Acharya, 2007, p. 648; Jones, 2010). 
 
Both Beijing and Washington are vying for influence in this strategic key region. 
China’s influence has increased considerably at political, economic and security 
levels over the past decade, while the U.S remained entangled in the ‘war on 
terror’ in Central Asia and the Middle East. China’s economic support has helped 
many national economies recover from the financial crisis of the late 1990s. The 
ASEAN-China Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) of 2002 and bilateral FTA’s with 
China constitute a considerable opportunity for Southeast Asian economies. At the 
same time, China’s economic dominance, uncertainty about Beijing’s intentions in 
the region and prevalent conflict, most notably in the South China Sea, cause 
concern among regional governments. As the past few years have demonstrated, 
ASEAN is yet to form a cohesive unit, a vacuum that benefits Beijing’s efforts to 
increase its influence on regional politics, as it did at the 2012 ASEAN Forum in 
Phnom Penh, where the Association was divided over what action to take on the 
South China Sea tensions (Hunt, 2012). This has led several regional governments 
to deepen their relationship with external powers including the U.S., which has 
increased its diplomatic and military presence in anticipation of China’s challenge 
to its global leadership status, fanning fears of regional coalition-building as 
Washington and Beijing are set to compete for regional influence.  
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As a regional bloc, ASEAN seeks to be independent of the influence of external 
powers and intends to strengthen its own role and centrality in regional affairs. A 
cohesive and assertive ASEAN would not need U.S. leadership and would provide 
a strong deterrent to Chinese dominance in the South China Sea and the wider 
Asia-Pacific (Kurlantzick, 2012, p. 1). Yet in order to achieve unity within a 
grouping made up of a diverse range of political systems that is often weighed 
down by its own institutional arrangements, ASEAN might be in need of high-
profile leadership to accelerate an otherwise protracted process of community-
building. Indonesia has been all too willing to claim this role, as it emerges from 
years of crisis and conflict, to come forward as the ‘natural leader’ of the 
Association, a status potentially at threat from Beijing’s advances in the region. 
More than most other countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesia and China have 
shared a difficult relationship in the recent past. Jakarta’s historical relationship 
with Beijing warrants a closer look, as this context is a significant factor in 
Indonesia’s national role conceptions and the way they shape Jakarta’s policy 
goals in the region, most notably Jakarta’s aspirations for regional leadership. 
 
The China Factor 
The role and influence of China in the region provides an important perspective on 
explaining Indonesia’s foreign policy orientation as Jakarta’s attitude towards 
Beijing is determined by both cooperation and antagonism, informed by the two 
countries’ historically turbulent relationship. In May 2011 Foreign Minister 
Natalegawa suggested during a state visit by Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
that the relationship between Indonesia and China was at an all time high ("China-
Indonesia relationship at all time high: Marty," 2011). In fact, since Jakarta and 
Beijing restored diplomatic relations in 1990, common strategic and economic 
interests have furthered engagement at bilateral as well as multilateral levels. But 
an analysis of Indonesia’s relationship with China indicates that Jakarta continues 
to nurture a latent apprehension of Beijing’s influence and aspirations in the 
region, a perception that gains significance as Jakarta’s own ambitions become 
more defined and as China’s power and influence grow.  
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China’s participation in ASEAN-driven regional processes has helped Beijing 
develop closer ties with numerous ASEAN members, facilitated by deepening 
economic relations and the compatibility of the Chinese government’s worldview 
with some of the tenets of the ‘ASEAN Way’ of diplomacy, such as non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member states (Bellamy, 2004, p. 103). 
Hugh White (2005, p. 472) of the Australian National University pointed out in 
2005 that “China has had great success in converting economic opportunities into 
regional political influence”. Beijing’s influence is such that it can “balance” 
internal ASEAN rivalries, such as those between Vietnam versus Laos and 
Cambodia (Bolt, 2011, p. 280). The influence China thus exerts on some ASEAN 
members can have a considerable impact on the sense of unity and cohesion in the 
Association. This was evident when the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
(AMM) in Phnom Penh for the first time in its 45-year history failed to produce a 
joint communiqué, due to Manila’s and Hanoi’s insistence on including a 
reference to the South China Sea dispute. Phnom Penh’s refusal was credited to 
undue influence of Beijing (Hunt, 2012) and raised questions as to ASEAN’s 
future ("Cambodia has put Asean's future in jeopardy," 2012). 
 
Jakarta’s perspective of China has been marked by antagonism for centuries. This 
sentiment can be traced back to invasions in the 13th and 15th Century, and finds its 
20th Century equivalent in Communist China’s advances in the region and 
antagonism towards Indonesia’s economically influential Chinese minority. 
Throughout most of Indonesia’s post-independence history, China was perceived 
as an expansionist regional power, indeed as the country’s “prime potential 
adversary” (Leifer, 1999, pp. 91-93). 
 
Jakarta established diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1950. Deepening ties 
between Sukarno’s Indonesia and Beijing marked the subsequent years as China 
supported the pro-Beijing Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia, or PKI), on which Sukarno relied for domestic support (Bert, 1985, p. 
970). But elements within the Indonesian Armed Forces were suspicious of 
China’s intentions in Indonesia. The killing of several generals that led to the army 
seizing control in 1965 was blamed on the PKI and portrayed as an effort to turn 
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Indonesia into a Communist client state as part of China’s hegemonic aspirations 
in Southeast Asia (Sukma, 2009b). 
 
Following the abortive coup of 1965, Jakarta “froze” diplomatic relations with 
China in 1967 for Beijing’s alleged involvement in the incident. For China this 
was a “major foreign-policy disaster” (Mozingo, 1976, p. 13). But Beijing had 
little control over the factors leading to the rupture, which was brought about by 
competition for domestic power (Bert, 1985; Mozingo, 1976). Following the 1967 
change of government and the further institutionalisation of the military’s 
influence on domestic and foreign affairs, China was construed as the main threat 
to national security and to domestic and regional stability (Leifer, 1999, p. 93; 
Storey, 2000, p. 147; Sukma, 2009b, p. 593). The military effectively manipulated 
the perception of the “China threat” that was to considerably shape Indonesia’s 
domestic and foreign policies for three decades as Suharto’s regime claimed 
legitimacy primarily as the shield that fended off the Communist take-over of 
Indonesia (Leifer, 1999, p. 94; Storey, 2000, p. 153; Sukma, 2009b, p. 604). 
 
During Suharto’s ‘New Order’, Indonesia’s foreign policy was largely determined 
by economic factors, which eventually necessitated an improvement of the Sino-
Indonesian relationship. Jakarta pursued relationships with those countries that 
were seen to contribute to Indonesia’s economic development by providing aid 
and investment, such as Japan and the West. As China’s opening improved 
relations in the region from the early 1970s, Beijing signalled readiness for 
renewed relations with Jakarta. Also Indonesian Foreign Affairs officials began 
promoting renewed ties with Beijing, but the military’s objection prevailed. China 
had “little choice but to wait patiently until the Indonesians [were] ready to move” 
(Bert, 1985, p. 977). ASEAN members Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines had 
already established diplomatic and trade relations with China in the mid-1970s. 
China’s growing economic status was well posed to also accommodate 
Indonesia’s search for new markets for the country’s primary commodities.  
 
The Sino-US rapprochement in 1972 further indicated that Indonesia was running 
risk of being left behind in economic and diplomatic terms was it to continue its 
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“calculated practice of disengagement” (Leifer, 1999, p. 88). It was Suharto, in a 
show of force suggesting his emancipation from military backing, who took the 
opportunity to eventually respond to China’s recurring overtures at a time when 
economically and geopolitically the benefits of a relationship with China 
outweighed the perceived threat to national security.11 Direct trade relations were 
already re-established in 1985. Diplomatic relations were restored in 1990, though 
they would not warm up significantly until after Suharto stepped down in 1998, 
since “Indonesia’s political elite, especially the military, remained suspicious of 
China” (Sukma, 2009b, p. 600). Once diplomatic relations were restored, however, 
both countries emphasised the positive impact this was to have on peace and 
stability in the region (Storey, 2000, p. 150). 
 
Jakarta stood to benefit from restored ties both economically and strategically. 
ASEAN’s involvement in the Cambodian conflict provided Indonesia with an 
opportunity to consolidate the image of regional leader and mediator, which 
necessitated opening channels with Beijing (Suryadinata, 1990, p. 691; van der 
Kroef, 1986, p. 934). Jakarta further hoped to assume chairmanship of the Non-
Aligned Movement. Continued “frozen” ties with one of the major regional 
powers would have sent the wrong message and could have put into question 
Indonesia’s commitment to its non-aligned status (Leifer, 1999, p. 89; Storey, 
2000, pp. 148-149; Suryadinata, 1990).12 With diplomatic relations restored, 
Indonesia was set to pursue its leadership ambition of becoming the ‘prime 
manager’ of regional order within Southeast Asia (Leifer, 1999, p. 99). 
 
The improvement of ties that set in at the end of the 1990s can largely be credited 
to China’s efforts at projecting a benevolent image to the region as a whole, of 
which also Sino-Indonesian relations benefited. The Asian financial crisis of 
1997/98 provided China with an opportunity to increase its political clout in the 
region. By providing Indonesia and other ASEAN countries with bilateral aid 
packages to address the crisis, China projected the image of a responsible power 
                                                11	   This	   eventual	   turn	   highlights	   the	   fact	   that	   Suharto	   was	   the	   final	   arbiter	   in	   the	   Sino-­‐Indonesian	   relationship,	   rather	   than	   the	   Department	   of	   Foreign	   Affairs.	   The	   economic	  benefits	  accrued	  by	  the	  restoration	  of	  ties	  further	  cemented	  Suharto’s	  claim	  to	  be	  the	  nation’s	  ‘father	  of	  development’	  (Leifer,	  1999,	  p.	  88;	  Suryadinata,	  1990,	  pp.	  686,	  691).	  12	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Indonesia	  does	  not	  yet	  maintain	  formal	  diplomatic	  relations	  with	  Israel.	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that somewhat dissipated the notion of a regional hegemon (Lijun, 2007; Storey, 
2000). The Wahid administration further advanced bilateral relations, in particular 
in trade, of which Indonesia stood to greatly benefit. But Jakarta was also offended 
by Western support for East Timor’s independence and criticism of Jakarta’s 
handling of the crisis. This soured relationships with the U.S., Australia and other 
Western countries for several years and led to a closer alignment with China. 
Beijing also quickly responded after the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 and 
provided aid along with expertise to Indonesia and other affected countries, which 
lent further credit to China’s “charm offensive” toward Southeast Asia (Sukma, 
2009b).  
 
The Megawati and Yudhoyono administrations continued to intensify bilateral 
trade relations. President Yudhoyono (cited in Sukma, 2009b, p. 603) said in 2005 
“our target in [developing relations with] China is to look for an opportunity to 
fulfill [sic] our national interests. We have to get something from the rise of China, 
especially in economic terms”. Today, China is Indonesia's second-largest trading 
partner, with trade projected to rise from US$ 60 billion in 2011 to 80 billion in 
2015 (Booth, 2011). Other ASEAN countries benefit equally from trade relations 
with China. China is now “the primary supporter of ASEAN’s aspiration to 
prosperity and prestige through multilateral economic liberalisation”, manifested 
in the ACFTA (Bolt, 2011, p. 280). Yet Indonesia’s trade deficit is increasing, 
suggesting that China holds the competitive advantage in the current economic 
structure (Booth, 2011).  
 
Progress was also made in the defence and security sector (Sukma, 2009b, p. 596). 
The establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 already served 
to expand ASEAN’s security cooperation and engage extra-regional powers, 
including China, by and large in less controversial aspects of non-traditional 
security. Traditional issues of defence cooperation were at the time largely 
reserved for bilateral relationships (Laksmana, 2011a, p. 89). This suited Beijing’s 
“new diplomacy”, which sought to advance international cooperation to foster 
economic growth and project China’s image of a responsible power (Bolt, 2011, p. 
278). In 1997 Beijing announced its desire for multilateral security cooperation. 
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China’s multilateral engagement led to an improvement of relationships with 
ASEAN alongside deepening bilateral ties. Following the Declaration on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and China’s accession to the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), ASEAN and China entered a “strategic 
partnership for peace and prosperity” at the ASEAN Summit in 2003.13 
 
Despite initial concerns, Indonesia came to actively support China’s membership 
in multilateral bodies such as the ARF (Leifer, 1999, p. 99). Starting with 
ASEAN’s and Indonesia’s engagement in the Cambodian conflict, the years of 
difficult relations with Beijing had already been replaced by a renewed 
commitment to regional cooperation. Jakarta subsequently transformed into one of 
the most active regional supporters of multilateralism as it “sees multipolarity as 
the best way of accommodating the great powers” (Storey, 2000, p. 165). Jakarta 
believes that China’s enmeshment in multilateral dialogues will consolidate 
respect for norms of peaceful coexistence, state conduct and good citizenship and 
that the ‘constraining influence of interdependence’ would trigger benefits in areas 
of divergence, such as the South China Sea dispute (Leifer, 1999, p. 100).  
 
In 2005 both countries agreed on a strategic partnership, which “shall be a non-
aligned and non-exclusive relationship aimed at promoting peace, stability and 
prosperity of the two countries and its peoples” (Republic of Indonesia & People's 
Republic of China, 2005). This partnership led to a joint missile production 
agreement ("Indonesia, China to strengthen defense cooperation," 2011), 
coordinated sea patrols (Adamrah, 2011), and joint military exercises ("Indonesia, 
Chinese armed forces stage anti-terror exercise," 2012).  
 
At the same time, Indonesia perceives China’s rising influence in the region with 
some apprehension (Leifer, 1999, p. 99). Santo Darmosumarto (2011, p. 160) 
Assistant Special Staff on International Relations for the President, cautioned that 
if Indonesia failed to pursue a ‘well-calibrated engagement’ with China, “sooner 
or later Indonesia would find itself at the short end of the relationship, unable to 
                                                13	  See	   the	   Joint	  Declaration	  of	   the	  Heads	  of	  State/Government	  of	   the	  Association	  of	  Southeast	  
Asian	   Nations	   and	   the	   People’s	   Republic	   of	   China	   on	   Strategic	   Partnership	   for	   Peace	   and	  
Prosperity,	  online	  available	  at:	  http://www.aseansec.org/15265.htm.	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stand shoulder-to-shoulder with China and its growing power”. The relationship 
with China thus is, according to Rizal Sukma, “one of the most difficult challenges 
in Indonesia’s foreign policy” (2009b, p. 592).  
 
Indonesia’s own sense of entitlement for regional leadership, which is Jakarta’s 
dominant national role conception, puts it in a geopolitical rivalry with China as 
Jakarta shares with Beijing a “mirror image […] in its view of its rightful place 
within the regional environment” (Leifer, 1999, pp. 87,99). China’s economic and 
political ‘invasion’ of this region and its implication for cohesion in the 
Association threaten Indonesia’s sense of standing in Southeast Asia and 
strengthen apprehension and suspicion of China’s ambitions. Leifer asserted that 
China and Indonesia are natural geopolitical rivals within the wider region, yet this 
perception is unlikely to be shared equally by Beijing and Jakarta (Leifer, 1999, p. 
99). Bert (1985, p. 978) noted in 1985, when diplomatic ties between Jakarta and 
Beijing were still “frozen”, that China perceived Indonesia as a serious rival for 
power in Southeast Asia. With China’s rise this rivalry perception on Beijing’s 
part has substantially diminished and there is no evidence in the current literature 
or in the media that suggests otherwise. Chinese decision-makers are probably 
well aware of Indonesia’s regional leadership aspirations. Chinese President Hu 
Jintao commented in 2012 that China attaches importance to Indonesia's status and 
influence in the region ("Chinese, Indonesian presidents meet on cooperation," 
2012).  
 
The legacy of the turbulent Sino-Indonesian relationship also continues to shape 
the thinking of influential elements within Indonesia’s policy and military elite. 
These groups share their ambition for Indonesia’s regional leadership and global 
role with those members of Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual community 
less concerned about China’s rise. The foreign policy elite is traditionally more 
inclined towards cooperation with China, but not free of antagonism towards 
Beijing (Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 164). The military is historically suspicious of 
China’s regional intentions and continues to command some influence over 
foreign policymaking, despite post-Suharto reforms that placed it under civilian 
control and substantially curtailed its political role (Dosch, 2006, pp. 53-54; 
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Laksmana, 2011a, pp. 82-83). As many former career soldiers enter politics, 
military elements also continue to exert influence on national politics. Anti-
Chinese sentiments, while nowhere near their historical level, are still evident. The 
likely 2014 presidential candidacy of former Special Forces (Kopassus) 
commander and former Head of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), 
Prabowo Subianto, who was widely held responsible for the 1998 riots that 
targeted Indonesia’s Chinese minority, concerns many among the Chinese 
community (Gopalakrishnan, 2012).14 The notion of the “latent dangers of 
communism” is also still tangible in Indonesia (Mandari, 2012; Storey, 2000, p. 
153).15  
 
These perceptions thus far do not outweigh the mutual benefits derived from this 
relationship but China’s growing assertiveness increasingly concerns Jakarta. 
Indonesia’s strategy of engagement with Beijing is in accordance with the 
country’s role conceptions of regional sub-system collaborator, mediator, and 
independent and active. Yet this strategy is strongly informed by Indonesia’s 
historical antagonism towards China and the perceived threat a rising global power 
China could pose to Indonesia’s role conception of leader in ASEAN and global 
actor, as Jakarta would likely be hard posed to realise its global role without a 
solid regional footing in a cohesive regional bloc. Indonesian decision-makers thus 
already pursue, according to McArdle (2012) the beginnings of a “congagement” 
strategy that seeks to transcend a policy of engagement analogous to a policy of 
containment.16 
 
This threat perception is also by no means limited to Indonesia. Several ASEAN 
countries are in dispute with China, including over sovereignty claims in the South 
China Sea. Some analysts see the balance of the ‘China threat’ as ASEAN’s key 
rationale for continued existence (Bellamy, 2004, p. 102; Leifer, 1999, p. 101; 
Storey, 2000, p. 162; see also Zin & Joseph, 2012, p. 108). A 2009 report by the 
                                                
14 Anti-­‐Chinese	   sentiments	   also	   sparked	   a	   controversy	   in	   Jakarta’s	   2012	   gubernatorial	  elections	  (McDowell,	  2012;	  "Teror	  melalui	  video	  'Koboy	  Cina'	  dinilai	  konyol,"	  2012).	  15	  In	  2009	  the	  Indonesian	  Attorney	  General’s	  Department	  banned	  several	  books	  with	  alleged	  communist	   content	   (Lane,	   2010).	   More	   recently,	   the	   commander	   of	   Central	   Java	   and	  Yogyakarta,	  Maj.	  Gen.	  Hardiono	  Saroso,	  warned	  he	  would	  “steadfastly	  annihilate”	  suspected	  efforts	  to	  revitalise	  the	  defunct	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Indonesia	  (Timur,	  2012).	  16	  See	  also	  Anwar	  (2010b,	  p.	  138).	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Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) found that 
China was seen as the largest threat to regional peace and security by a majority of 
Asian elites, while the U.S. was valued for its stabilising role (Gill, Green, Tsuji, 
& Watts, 2009).17 It thus comes as no surprise that in “an expression of its 
uncertainty about the role and intentions of China […] in the region”, Jakarta 
insisted on the inclusion of the U.S., India, Australia, Russia and other external 
powers in the East Asia Summit (Sukma, 2009b, p. 607). The disputes in the South 
China Sea bring this perspective into focus.  
Conflict	  in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea	  
The South China Sea disputes highlight the pivotal role China’s rise plays in 
Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour towards ASEAN security regionalism. The 
South China Sea is a rich fishing ground and harbours potentially extensive oil and 
gas reserves, while it is located in one of the most frequented commercial sea-
lanes. Conflict in the South China Sea ensued in the mid-1970s, when China took 
over the Paracel Islands from Vietnam after a brief militarised dispute. The South 
China Sea is a potential flashpoint for confrontation between several claimant 
states. Disputes persist also around the Spratley Islands between China, Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines for economic and strategic reasons 
(Acharya, 2000b, p. 137).  
 
As a non-claimant state and in accordance with its role conceptions as leader, 
independent and active, bridge, and mediator Jakarta has actively facilitated 
dialogue between claimant states. Indonesia has pursued a diffusion of tensions 
since 1990 by hosting annual ‘track two’ workshops as a means of building trust 
and confidence. By providing an informal environment for government 
representatives, organisers hope to expand “mutual understanding among the 
participants through dialogues and concrete cooperation projects”, such as 
navigational safety, piracy and the environment.18 The impact of these workshops, 
is doubtful, however, and many officials involved voiced frustration over the 
Chinese delegation’s seemingly obstructionist tactics (Leifer, 1999, p. 95). There 
                                                17	  See	  also	  Bolt	  (2011).	  18	  See	  Statement	  of	   the	  20th	  Workshop	  on	  “Managing	  Potential	  Conflicts	   in	  the	  South	  China	  Sea”,	  Bandung,	  Indonesia,	  1-­‐3	  November	  2010.	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is, moreover, a dearth of recent scholarship on this initiative. The effectiveness and 
influence of ‘track two’ processes on regional political and security cooperation 
has been questioned elsewhere (Capie, 2010). While annual workshops continue to 
be conducted, this initiative’s influence on dispute resolution in the South China 
Sea would require further analysis. The workshops, however, further add to 
Indonesia’s image in view of above role conceptions. 
 
Although Indonesia is not considered a claimant state in the disputes, China’s 
claims could potentially infringe Indonesia’s sovereignty. These claims extend to 
the territorial waters surrounding the Natuna Islands, part of Indonesia’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone. The Natuna Islands hold substantial liquefied natural gas 
reserves.19 Jakarta and the military view the area as a potential major flashpoint 
(Jordan, 2012; McArdle, 2012). Following an inconclusive response by Beijing 
over the settlement of the dispute in the 1990s the Indonesian Government 
justified the resettlement of several thousand families to the islands under its 
transmigration scheme in order to assert its sovereignty (Storey, 2000, p. 158ff). 
The Armed Forces’ acquisition of air and naval capabilities in the early 1990s was 
also rationalised with the necessity to protect the Natuna Islands and surrounding 
waters (Storey, 2000, p. 158ff). In May 2012 the military announced plans to 
increase the number of troops on the islands ("Pasukan di Natuna sangat penting," 
2012). In 1996 and 2008 Jakarta held some of the country’s largest joint military 
exercises there – a message to Beijing that Jakarta might consider using military 
force to ward off any challenge to its national assets (Bolt, 2011, p. 289; 
Laksmana, 2011c; Leifer, 1999, p. 103).  
 
Beijing’s growing assertiveness over its claims in the South China Sea as well as 
its ambiguous defence capability build-up throughout the 1990s and 2000s have 
aggravated Indonesian fears of China’s intentions in the region. ASEAN and 
China signed the Declaration on the Code of Parties in the South China Sea in 
2002, a “high point in de-escalation” after the turbulent 1990s (Bolt, 2011, pp. 
284-285). Yet divisions within ASEAN as well as China’s energy security 
                                                19	   In	   2010,	   the	   Natuna	   natural	   gas	   project	   accounted	   for	   25%	   of	   the	   country’s	   overall	  commercially	   recoverable	   gas	   reserves	   (Thomas,	   2012).	   Vietnam	   also	   claims	   some	   of	   the	  waters	  surrounding	  the	  Natuna	  Islands	  (Storey,	  2000,	  p.	  157).	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interests and growing nationalism hamper progress towards a code of conduct, 
which Indonesia had hoped to finalise when it chaired the Association in 2011. 
Stand-offs between China and the U.S. near the Hainan Islands in 2009 (Sutter, 
2009), China and Indonesia over the Natuna Islands in 2010 (Currie, 2010), and 
between China and Vietnam and China and the Philippines in 2012 (Glaser, 2012) 
further added to the tension. The nationalist undertones of the dispute with Japan 
in the East China Sea also reinforce the image of an increasingly assertive China. 
 
Indonesia’s efforts at addressing the South China Sea disputes capture the extent 
of Jakarta’s concerns. China’s sovereignty claim over much of the South China 
Sea could potentially put it in “command of the maritime heart of the region”, thus 
directly challenging Indonesia’s leadership aspirations in Southeast Asia (Leifer, 
1999, p. 90). Indonesia’s ‘intensive shuttle diplomacy’ in response to the failure to 
produce a joint communiqué at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh in 
July 2012 over the South China Sea dispute highlights concerns over ASEAN 
cohesion and the impression this could create internationally ("ASEAN reaches 
consensus on 6-point principles on South China Sea," 2012). Foreign Minister 
Natalegawa was quick to dismiss claims that ASEAN was not united (Luftia, 
2012a). In 2013, Indonesia seeks to advance the implementation of a declaration 
of maritime conduct agreed to by China and ASEAN in 2011 and to further pursue 
a code of conduct to reduce tensions in the region (Sagita, 2013). This is indicative 
of what is at stake for Jakarta.  
 
ASEAN, long considered the ‘cornerstone’ of Indonesia’s foreign policy 
(Laksmana, 2011b, p. 161), provides Indonesia with a means to realise its 
ambition towards regional leadership. A weak ASEAN could prevent Jakarta from 
fulfilling this aspiration. A cohesive regional grouping that would find its 
expression in the successful creation of the ASEAN Community thus is a crucial 
prerequisite for strengthening the Association vis-à-vis the real and perceived 
influence of China and other external powers.  
 
The disputes remain unresolved and the South China Sea could be the litmus test 
for regional peace and stability as well as for ASEAN’s unity and the emerging 
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shape of the regional order. The ongoing disputes in the South China Sea have 
contributed to China’s ‘charm offensive’ losing momentum, further aggravated by 
fears about China’s increasing economic leverage and resource and border 
tensions in mainland Southeast Asia. This is changing the perception China’s 
neighbours have of Beijing’s intentions in the region, to the extent that “the level 
of concern regarding the impact of China’s rising regional profile has increased 
markedly” (Storey, 2010).  
 
This has led both claimant states and Indonesia to deepen relationships with other 
powers. Many regional governments welcome the recent ‘rebalancing’ of the U.S. 
as it could potentially offset China’s influence. At the ASEAN meeting in Hanoi 
in 2010 former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. role in 
regional stability and reiterated U.S. support for multilateral discussions on the 
disputes, an approach Beijing rejects in favour of bilateral talks (Bolt, 2011, p. 
285).  
 
Indonesia and the U.S. entered a comprehensive partnership in 2010, focusing on 
the key areas of democracy, the economy, and climate change, though most 
progress has been made in military-to-military ties and defence trade (Hiebert & 
Magpile, 2012). President Yudhoyono had proposed the initiative in 2008. Jakarta 
did not want to create the impression that this partnership was directed against 
Beijing, which led former defence minister Juwono Sudarsono (cited in Onishi, 
2010) to suggest that Indonesia wants “to maintain a strategic space from the 
rivalry between the United States and China,” acknowledging the importance of 
both to Indonesia. This is in accordance with the national role conceptions of 
bridge, mediator and independent and active. This notion is also in the interest of 
Washington, which considers Jakarta’s middle-power status less threatening to 
Beijing and likely to influence China’s behaviour quite differently from 
Washington’s efforts (Gilley, 2012). This image suits Jakarta as it reinforces its 
profile as a positive influence on regional peace and stability.  
 
Indonesia further advanced its security partnership with Australia, and in 2012 
signed a new defence co-operation agreement with commitments to future joint 
  42 
exercises and a focus on trading defence equipment (Bachelard, 2012). Indonesia 
further signed a strategic partnership agreement with India in 2005, which includes 
a commitment to advance defence and military cooperation. Other ASEAN 
governments also strengthen extra-regional ties. The U.S. is re-affirming ties with 
allies and partners, such as the Philippines and Thailand, respectively, and with 
new partners such as Burma. Also Japan’s growing presence in Southeast Asia is 
in response to China’s regional influence, a policy trajectory re-affirmed by the 
new administration that came into office at the end of 2012 (French, 2012; Shixin, 
2013; Singh, 2013).   
 
Jakarta’s foreign policy behaviour in the shifting regional order can be explained 
through Indonesia’s role conceptions. Indonesia’s engagement with major external 
powers, in particular with China and the U.S. is reminiscent of Hatta’s notion of 
‘steering between two reefs’, which has again entered Indonesia’s foreign policy 
discourse (see, for instance, Cullum, 2010). Jakarta’s current approach remains 
true to its constitutional discourse as Indonesia deploys diplomacy as the first line 
of defence (McArdle, 2012). This approach to national and regional security is 
reflected in the President’s ‘million friend diplomacy’ and in Indonesia’s support 
for multilateralism and regional security cooperation. Indonesia’s perception of 
China as a potential threat and rival for regional leadership thus does not preclude 
the high levels of cooperation and convergence that characterise the current 
relationship. To the contrary, the perception of a potential ‘China threat’ leaves 
Indonesia no choice but to engage Beijing “on a leveled [sic] playing field” 
(Darmosumarto, 2011, p. 165). Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa (cited in 
Acharya, 2011) thus posits that the “answer to regional tensions lies not in inviting 
the US to balance China militarily, but in expanding and deepening Asean's [sic] 
engagement with both the US and China”.  
 
Despite Beijing’s resistance to internationalising the South China Sea disputes, 
China is an active participant in regional multilateralism, which thus far has 
arguably been centred on ASEAN as the main vehicle for managing regional 
order. Successfully implementing the ASEAN Community by 2015, still 
considered a rather ambitious goal (Brata, 2013), is a top priority in order to 
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strengthen ASEAN cohesiveness and advance regional security cooperation in 
order to consolidate ASEAN centrality. For Jakarta, which plays a pivotal role in 
security regionalism, this would be a significant step towards consolidating 
Indonesia’s status as the ‘natural leader’ of ASEAN and ‘prime manager’ of the 
regional order. The progress made towards deepening regional security 
cooperation could serve as an indicator of Indonesia’s leadership credentials and 
the country’s status as regional middle-power and global actor. Slow progress, on 
the other hand, could suggest a lack of ASEAN cohesion and could raise doubts as 
to Indonesia’s leadership potential and ASEAN’s credibility as a regional 
grouping. I will now turn to a discussion of ASEAN’s evolving security 
regionalism and how Indonesia’s national role conceptions translate into Jakarta’s 
foreign policy behaviour in regional security cooperation. 
Policy	  Responses	  Towards	  Regional	  Security	  Cooperation	  
The previous section outlined the domestic and geopolitical context within which 
Indonesia’s national role conceptions should be analysed. In this section I will 
analyse initiatives in ASEAN regionalism that emphasise how these role 
conceptions translate into Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour. In the course of 
these developments, the persistence of the principles entailed in the ‘ASEAN 
Way’, in particular the norm of non-interference in domestic affairs, has held back 
progress. The Association aims to maintain a delicate balance between the ‘old 
ways’ on the one hand, and the liberal agenda promoted by Indonesia and other 
ASEAN members on the other. This tension is evident in the ASEAN Charter and 
progress towards the ASEAN Political Security Community (APSC), as well as in 
ASEAN’s approach to human rights and conflict resolution. First I will discuss the 
context of ASEAN’s liberal turn, of which Indonesia is among the strongest 
proponents, with the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to human rights two 
essential indicators of these developments. I will then address the specific 
measures taken towards ASEAN security cooperation, focusing on the APSC, 
ASEAN’s approach to a regional mechanism for conflict resolution and the 
relevance of NTS cooperation for security regionalism.  
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The Liberal Turn 
The promotion of liberal norms and values is not a recent phenomenon in ASEAN. 
Article 2 of the Bangkok Declaration (1967), ASEAN’s founding document, states 
that the aim and purpose of the Association is “[t]o promote regional peace and 
stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law”. Yet for decades 
this commitment was evident merely in intergovernmental relations, not in the 
domestic sphere. The recent “pursuit of liberalism”, said to be the most urgent 
item on ASEAN’s agenda (Katsumata, 2007), is reflected in the pledge to the 
principles of the rule of law, good governance and the promotion and protection of 
human rights as articulated in the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s approach to 
human rights. How this pledge translates into actual policy behaviour domestically 
is another matter. As I have indicated above, Indonesia at times shows more 
political will to promote such principles regionally than it demonstrates 
implementing these same principles domestically. This applies equally to other 
proponents of the liberal turn, such as the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia. The 
commitment of countries inclined to resist related regional policy changes, such as 
Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, towards adhering to the rule of law and the 
protection of human rights domestically also must at times be questioned. 
 
Developments in several Southeast Asian countries have over the past decade 
nonetheless been characterised by an opening of political space. This is evident in 
an increasingly prominent discourse on liberal norms and values, or a pro-
democracy and human rights rhetoric at the ASEAN level, accompanied by some 
degree of political liberalisation across most regional polities including, most 
recently, in Burma. Catalysts of these shifts can be found in the people power 
movement of the Philippines in the 1980s, which led to the overthrow of the 
Marcos regime in 1986, and the public protests in Thailand in the early 1990s that 
ushered in democratic reforms in this country (Jetschke, 1999; Mewengkang, 
2012). Southeast Asia’s ‘democratic moment’ (Acharya, 1999), triggered by the 
reverberations of the financial crisis of the late 1990s, turned out to be a lasting 
transformation, no matter how rocky the road has been and, arguably, continues to 
be. The varied responses by regional governments to the financial crisis and 
international pressure helped facilitate political reforms (Acharya, 1999, p. 421). 
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Most notably was Indonesia’s transformation from an authoritarian regime with a 
politically influential military to a liberal democracy with civilian-controlled 
security forces and Jakarta’s subsequent efforts to build on its image as a model 
and proponent of liberal democracy and leading force in ASEAN regionalism.  
 
Domestic and regional factors have been highlighted as a key determinant in this 
regional development (Acharya, 1999; Mewengkang, 2012). The strengthening of 
civil society pro-democracy movements, a phenomenon Acharya (1999, p. 419) 
called the ‘democratic contagion’, increased the level of legitimacy and 
accountability of national governments and facilitated a more transparent approach 
to policy-making across all countries in the region (Dosch, 2008, p. 542; 
Mewengkang, 2012, p. 6). Dosch (2008, p. 530) considers this development a 
consequence of democratic norms and values diffusing from domestic to regional 
political spheres, in particular from ASEAN founding members Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia. However, Burma’s opening of political space that 
surprised regional and international observers alike was not necessarily due to 
ASEAN’s engagement with the regime. Instead, Naypyidaw’s concessions were 
motivated by domestic and extra-regional factors (Zin & Joseph, 2012).  
 
Several individuals from the policy and intellectual community across ASEAN 
and within Indonesia have played a pivotal role in advancing and institutionalising 
ASEAN’s liberal turn. Also ‘traditional’ civil society actors contributed to the 
emerging liberal agenda through values-based political linkages and activism, 
advancing a “parallel track of regionalism” (Acharya, 2000b, p. 140; see also 
Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 24). The ASEAN-ISIS, the track-two network of 
regional think tanks and research institutes is said to have “been instrumental in 
shaping the democracy and human rights agenda” in ASEAN, led by the Jakarta-
based Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) and the Manila-based 
Institute for Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) (Dosch, 2008, p. 535). 
These actors promote a vision of ASEAN, which reflects on internationally 
accepted norms and values, captured in the contributions of intellectuals such as 
Rizal Sukma and Yusuf Wanandi, both affiliated with the CSIS and involved in 
Indonesia’s formulation of ASEAN policy proposals. 
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When Indonesia was chairing ASEAN in 2003 the government advanced a 
comprehensive proposal that outlined Jakarta’s policy approach towards closer 
security cooperation. At the 2003 ASEAN Summit in Bali the grouping had 
already committed to the creation of an ASEAN Community. Under then Foreign 
Minister Hassan Wirajuda and with substantial input from Rizal Sukma, the 
government presented a proposal that contained a range of propositions, including 
the creation of an ASEAN Security Community as part of the ASEAN Community 
and regional mechanisms for human rights and conflict resolution.20 Other 
ASEAN governments were initially apprehensive of Indonesia’s ‘democracy 
agenda’ that challenged the principles enshrined in the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Sukma, 
2008, p. 138). A revised proposal was eventually adopted, but this episode 
highlighted the sensitivities around the regional preferences expressed in the 
‘ASEAN Way’, as well as regional governments’ cautious approach to aligning 
too closely with what they perceived as a Western, or American agenda (Carothers 
& Youngs, 2011, p. 17). This tension was most evident in the drafting of the 
ASEAN Charter, which had been mandated in the ASEAN Security Community 
Plan of Action (Djani, 2009, p. 139). 
The	  ASEAN	  Charter	  
The idea of creating an ASEAN Charter dates back to the early years of the 
Association, but it took 23 years for ASEAN to “raise the stake”, and Indonesia 
came to play a pivotal role in advancing the initiative (Djani, 2009, p. 138). The 
Charter had its forerunners in the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC) and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I) and was 
designed to be a framework for ASEAN to ensure peace and stability in the region. 
The Charter was further envisaged as a constitutional framework that would 
strengthen regional cohesion towards creating the ASEAN Community, also vis-à-
vis the emergence of powerful neighbours (Djani, 2009, p. 140). Adding clout to 
its leadership ambitions and its role conceptions as model democracy and regional 
sub-system collaborator, Indonesia played a key role in drafting the Charter as the 
concept of shaping and sharing of norms, which had been advanced by Foreign 
                                                20	  The	  ‘ASEAN	  Security	  Community’	  was	  later	  renamed	  ‘ASEAN	  Political	  Security	  Community’.	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Minister Wirajuda as a means towards community-building “became the basis for 
development of the Charter” (2009, p. 139). 
 
The Indonesian delegation had already advanced a complete draft in 2004 to move 
discussions ahead, but their draft was met with resistance by other ASEAN 
members (Djani, 2009, p. 139). ASEAN governments instead mandated the High 
Level Task Force on the Drafting of the ASEAN Charter (HLTF) with driving the 
process. Alongside the principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of 
law, the Indonesian delegation to the HLTF also raised the need for an ASEAN 
Human Rights Body and held an HLTF meeting with civil society and human 
rights experts to draft the framework for such a regional body (Djani, 2009, p. 
143). ASEAN further tasked an Eminent Persons Group (EPG), made up of 
regional leaders, with making recommendations towards the HLTF. The EPG 
included former Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, who had represented 
ASEAN during negotiations to end the Cambodian conflict and who had been an 
advocate of democratic reforms in Burma. The EPG facilitated the key 
involvement of respected senior statesmen and intellectuals familiar with, yet not 
necessarily bound by, the political processes of the grouping, which allowed for 
broader and potentially bolder visions and ideas to be brought into the process.  
 
Ahead of the final draft of the Charter, Jusuf Wanandi (2006) of the CSIS declared 
that the Charter should help “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Wanandi also 
argued that the Charter should facilitate a shift from the Association’s state-
centrism to a people-centric approach, with a focus on human security, including 
not only the rights, but also the obligations of member states. Accordingly, the 
Charter “should promote and develop a community of caring societies” (Wanandi, 
2006). Poverty and conflict are among the major factors underpinning most of the 
region’s serious human security concerns, which entail social, economic and 
environmental variables in addition to military and political dimensions of 
security. Emmerson (2007, p. 3), in reflecting on Wanandi’s comments, considers 
a people-centred approach a necessary step to account for the tensions stemming 
from domestic conditions of poverty and grievances that gave rise to violent 
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conflicts in several Southeast Asian countries, including the Philippines, Thailand 
and Indonesia. Wanandi’s proposition thus was aligned with Indonesia’s role 
conceptions as a model democracy and sub-system collaborator. It further reflects 
Jakarta’s role conception as a mediator and bridge, as his vision aims to reconcile 
the disparities between state and society. 
 
The Charter was adopted by ASEAN leaders in November 2007 and was declared 
a success, yet the spirit and vision of the EPG was watered down in the final 
version. After eleven months of negotiation the final draft that was presented at the 
13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore in 2007 aimed at translating the visions of the 
EPG into practical reality (Koh, Manalo, & Woon, 2009, p. xix). It established 
ASEAN as a legal entity, enshrined democracy, good governance, the rule of law 
and human rights among the Association’s repository of norms, and provided the 
mandate to create an ASEAN Human Rights Body (Rüland, 2009, p. 382). Some 
outside observers lauded ASEAN’s progress in democracy promotion. Dosch 
(2008, p. 533) argued “ASEAN’s explicit commitment to liberal concepts might 
be weak, but their inclusion in the charter indicates significant progress compared 
with 10 or even five years ago when any intergovernmental dialogue on 
democracy was out of the question”.21  
 
The final draft also attracted criticism for its lack of progress in challenging 
ASEAN’s core norms that many considered detrimental to advancing the liberal 
agenda. The final draft of the Charter did not meet the expectations of many of 
ASEAN’s progressive leaders, such as Wanandi, for its continued reference to the 
‘ASEAN Way’. The set of principles including sovereignty, non-interference and 
consensus-based decision-making is generally credited with having facilitated 
ASEAN’s maintenance of intergovernmental peace and stability throughout its 
existence. Yet the reference, in Article 2 of the Charter, to the norm of non-
interference rendered effective regional approaches to conflict resolution, an 
integral aspect of ASEAN’s progress towards the APSC, difficult, if not 
impossible.22  
                                                21	  See	  also	  Kelsall	  (2009,	  p.	  6).	  22	  The	  ASEAN	  Charter	  (2008).	  Online	  (accessed	  29	  January	  2013):	  www.asean.org/asean/asean-­‐charter/asean-­‐charter	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The drafting and ratification of the Charter reflected different perspectives on the 
norm of non-interference, which would begin to undergo a subtle revision 
throughout the following decade. Djani (2009, p. 142) commented that while 
ASEAN’s adherence to sovereignty and territorial integrity should be emphasised, 
“for matters seriously affecting the common interest of ASEAN, enhanced 
consultation can be undertaken and should not be construed as interference, 
particularly since ASEAN is considered as a family of nations”. This notion once 
more refers to Indonesia’s role conceptions as regional sub-system collaborator 
and mediator. A more qualified approach to interpreting the norm of non-
interference would find its most significant expression to date in ASEAN’s 
approach to addressing the human security situation in Burma after cyclone 
Nargis, an event I will discuss in more detail in the following section. 
 
Ratification of the Charter was delayed in Indonesia due to resistance from 
legislators critical of the watered down final version, despite “massive campaign 
efforts” by the Department of Foreign Affairs (Djani, 2009, p. 146). Indonesia 
was, in October 2008, the last ASEAN member to ratify the Charter. Indonesian 
legislators had insisted on an addendum to address the uncertainty surrounding the 
framework for the ASEAN Human Rights Body, a reform of the Association’s 
decision-making process and greater popular participation (Rüland, 2009, p. 386). 
This was not well received by many of the other governments which asserted that 
Indonesia was bullying the Association with its size and political weight (Rüland, 
2009, pp. 385, 387).  
 
The Indonesian legislature played a key role in shaping the final outcome, which 
included an addendum addressing the establishment of a regional human rights 
body and a framework for democracy promotion. With the Indonesian legislative 
thus at times maintaining what amounts to a veto power over Jakarta’s decision-
making ability (Anwar, 2010b; Laksmana, 2011b, p. 163), many other 
governments in ASEAN wondered how Indonesia could conclude binding 
agreements or honour and implement non-binding agreements when the country’s 
national interests or its regional and global ambitions are at stake (Rüland, 2009, p. 
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396). Indonesia’s foreign policy community is quite aware of how regional 
neighbours perceive the country’s weight and the domestic influence on regional 
decision-making. Natalegawa (cited in Cullum, 2010) quite explicitly affirmed 
Jakarta’s leadership ambition when he confirmed that  
 
“our diplomacy has to be a bit more thought through […] and well 
calibrated, and not to make it too obvious that we are trying to be 
imposing our thoughts and our will on our neighbors”.   
 
Although it represented a considerable success for Indonesia to have included a 
framework for creating a regional human rights body in the Charter, questions as 
to its potential impact remained. Critics among civil society and regional think 
tanks, along with some government representatives such as Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister George Yeo, also wondered whether the human rights body stipulated in 
the Charter would be an effective mechanism. ASEAN elites, they argued, lacked 
commitment to action and merely demonstrated rhetorical support for the idea 
(Durbach, Renshaw, & Byrnes, 2009, p. 214). With reference to Article 2 of the 
Charter, which reaffirms the principle of non-interference, critics pointed out that 
even in the event of gross human rights violations in a member state, other 
ASEAN members would have no legal grounds to interfere in the domestic affairs 
of the state in question (Kelsall, 2009, p. 3).  
 
Also the forum for democracy promotion that Indonesian legislators had insisted 
on was criticised as a mere rhetorical device. In 2008, Indonesia, together with 
Australia, established the state-sponsored Bali Democracy Forum in an “attempt to 
carve out a niche for Indonesia in Asian diplomacy” ("Feet of clay: Indonesia and 
its place in the world," 2011). The Forum is open to democratic and non-
democratic states and promotes dialogue on democracy in the region that is not 
burdened with the image of a Western top-down imposition of liberal norms and 
values (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 13). This initiative led TIME magazine to 
conclude that Indonesia “has emerged as Southeast Asia’s unlikely star” (Beech, 
2008). Critics, however, allege that the forum is only a superficial attempt at 
acknowledging universal human rights standards, while participants rarely address 
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some of the serious human rights issues in the region (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, 
pp. 13-14). 
 
Ultimately, the final draft of the ASEAN Charter might have been perceived a 
partial victory by Jakarta for having achieved the inclusion of a human rights 
agenda, against the resistance of most other regional governments. The Charter 
had, after all, already been ratified by all the remaining member states when 
Indonesia insisted on the addendum to the Charter ("Senate ratifies Asean charter," 
2008; "Surin welcomes Thailand's ratification of Asean charter," 2008). It was the 
pressure of Indonesia’s legislature that led Jakarta to insist on the provisos for 
democracy promotion and human rights. The persistence of legislators was likely 
informed by a desire to build on Indonesia’s credentials as a model democracy, 
which informs the international image Jakarta has been nurturing over the past 
decade. Moreover, it was a victory for those in Indonesia’s foreign policy 
community who see Indonesia in the role of the Association’s natural leader. But it 
is doubtful whether such a mechanism can further advance Indonesia’s role 
conception of mediator in regional affairs. 
 
Although the Charter was lauded as a significant step towards Southeast Asian 
regionalism, the prevalence of the non-interference norm suggested that as far as 
human rights are concerned, it would be more of the same. Moreover, without a 
clear framework for sanctions to address violations of the principles laid out in the 
Charter, many critics, among them Indonesian legislators and scholars, considered 
the Charter ‘basically powerless’ (in Rüland, 2009, p. 384). I will now analyse 
recent developments towards a regional approach to the protection and promotion 
of human rights, to determine whether these allegations levelled at ASEAN still 
hold true following the establishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 and the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration in 2012. 
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Human	  Rights	  in	  ASEAN	  
 
“[T]he norms and precepts for the observation of human rights vary from society 
to society …Nobody can claim to have a monopoly of wisdom to determine what is 
right and proper for all countries and peoples”, Mohammed Mahathir, former 
Prime Minister of Malaysia (Christie & Roy, 2001, p. 1). 
 
Long perceived and shunned as an instrument of Western imperialism, the 
regional human rights agenda was at last advanced through the commitment 
expressed in the ASEAN Charter to establish a regional human rights body. The 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was 
established in 2009, and was mandated with drafting the ASEAN Declaration on 
Human Rights, which was adopted in November 2012. Considering the ongoing 
resistance since Indonesia had first advanced its proposal in 2003, ASEAN 
appears to have made remarkable progress towards incorporating a human rights 
agenda into regional governance, though for many regional and international 
observers it is too early to celebrate as many questions remain. 
 
ASEAN’s regional approach to human rights in fact goes back to the early 1990s, 
and the slow evolution of determining a common ground highlights the historically 
ambiguous attitude towards the norm across the diverse member states. The 
objective of the promotion and protection of human rights was added to the 
Association’s agenda ahead of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 
in June 1993. ASEAN’s first official acknowledgement of a regional human rights 
objective was articulated in the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights, 
adopted ahead of the World Conference in April 1993 (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 
110). This objective was conditioned, however, with the affirmation of the 
principles of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference in the internal affairs of states.23 ASEAN further confirmed its 
                                                23	   Final	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Regional	   Meeting	   for	   Asia	   of	   the	   World	   Conference	   on	   Human	  Rights,	  Bangkok,	  Thailand,	  29	  March	  to	  2	  April	  1993.	  Online	  (accessed	  14	  December	  2012):	  http://www.law.hku.hk/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline8/Bangkok%20Declaration.htm	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“commitment to and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” in the 
Joint Communiqué of the 26th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1993, 
where governments had first agreed to consider the establishment of a regional 
human rights body, an initiative that would take another 16 years and considerable 
pressure from some ASEAN member countries to materialise.24  
 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines were the most active members 
in the multi-stakeholder Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights 
Mechanism that commenced work on developing recommendations regarding the 
framework in 1994. The human rights body eventually stipulated in Art. 14 of the 
ASEAN Charter was included under Jakarta’s insistence with support from Manila 
vis-à-vis governments critical of the mechanism, such as Burma, Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam (Durbach et al., 2009, p. 222).  
 
This regional human rights agenda might be a notable development for ASEAN, 
yet the region is only catching up with a process that has long been instituted in 
other parts of the world. Regional human rights bodies in Europe, the Americas 
and Africa had been established earlier and have long adopted declarations 
outlining regional commitments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR). The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was adopted 
in 1948. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention) came into force in 1953. The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) was adopted in 
1981. The Arab Charter of Human Rights (Arab Charter) was adopted in 1994, 
revised and again adopted in 2004 (Close & Askew, 2004, p. 111ff; Durbach et al., 
2009, p. 219). For ASEAN, the commitment towards establishing the body and 
drafting a declaration thus was clearly overdue, and possibly perceived as such as 
the Association was subject to growing criticism for its continued uncritical 
engagement with human rights in the region, most evident in international 
concerns about Burma (Close & Askew, 2004, pp. 113-114, 127ff).  
 
                                                24	  Article	   16	  of	   the	   “Joint	   Communiqué	  of	   the	  26th	  ASEAN	  Ministerial	  Meeting,”	   Singapore,	  23-­‐24	  July	  1993.	  Online	  (accessed	  14	  December,	  2012):	  www.aseanhrmech.org/downloads/1993_Joint_Communique.pdf	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Once ASEAN realised the creation of a regional human rights body, the initiative 
attracted praise but also criticism for what observers saw as a lack of independence 
from regional governments. ASEAN policy-makers were particularly encouraged 
by the potential of the body to ‘raise ASEAN’s international standing’ (Durbach et 
al., 2009, p. 214). Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary General, emphasised 
progress made towards regional cohesion, as he suggested that ASEAN member 
states had increased their comfort level in considering human rights issues 
(Tisnadibrata, 2012). Critics, on the other hand, claimed “it is a long way from the 
cautious acceptance of general democratic values to the active promotion and 
regional enforcements of rules based on these norms” (Dosch, 2008, p. 542). 
Indeed, the AICHR has been criticised for lacking real power and for putting more 
emphasis on promoting, less on protecting human rights, a shortcoming credited to 
the region’s adherence to principles of non-interference and state sovereignty 
(Anwar, 2010b; Johnston & Brown, 2009). According to Singapore’s 
Ambassador-at-Large, Tommy Koh, ASEAN member states are divided over the 
questions of whether the human rights mechanism should have the power to 
investigate and monitor human rights in member countries, whether the body 
should highlight the Association’s responsibilities as well, and how human rights 
principles can be reconciled with the principle of non-interference (Durbach et al., 
2009, p. 225). Alongside highlighting once more the persistent sentiments of the 
‘ASEAN Way’ these concerns also underline the centrality of regional 
governments in the current human rights discourse. 
 
The Commission is not mandated to deal with individual claims, thus limiting its 
capacity to protect the human rights of ASEAN citizens vis-à-vis the state. The 
Commission has further been criticised for its lack of independence, as it is made 
up by and large of government representatives and diplomats. Only the Indonesian 
and Thai commissioners have civil society and academic backgrounds 
respectively.25 The Commission, which along with the ASEAN Secretariat is 
based in Jakarta, reports to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM). This led 
critics to assert that the AICHR is not independent from governments but rather an 
                                                25	   Rafendi	   Djamin,	   the	   Indonesian	   Commissioner,	   continues	   to	   be	   an	   active	   civil	   society	  activist	  as	  the	  Coordinator	  of	  the	  Coalition	  of	  Indonesian	  NGO	  for	  International	  Human	  Rights	  Advocacy,	  online	  (accessed	  29	  January	  2013):	  http://aichr.org/about/aichr-­‐representatives.	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auxiliary body to the AMM ("In Indonesia, human rights body lacks teeth," 2012). 
Yap Swee Seng of the Bangkok-based Asian Forum for Human Rights and 
Development argued "[t]he AICHR has been given very weak terms of reference 
that limit its mandates, authority and powers to promote and protect human rights" 
("In Indonesia, human rights body lacks teeth," 2012), a shortcoming further 
highlighted in the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, which was adopted by 
member states in November 2012. 
 
The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration elicited widespread critique from regional 
observers and civil society for containing too many loopholes to be anything but a 
toothless tiger. Prior to the publication of the final draft, Indonesian Foreign 
Minister Natalegawa had already remarked “a document that must be reached via 
consensus will never please all parties” (Saragih, 2012). Critics point to the lack of 
transparency and stakeholder consultation in drafting the Declaration and the 
omission of several interest groups, such as indigenous peoples and the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) communities. Furthermore, they condemn 
the conditionality of ‘universal human rights’ that are subjected to cultural and 
national legal frameworks (Grebe, 2013; "In Indonesia, human rights body lacks 
teeth," 2012; Saragih, 2012). Ultimately, the declaration reflects provisos already 
formulated in the Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights (1993), which 
recognised universal human rights, yet within the context of “national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds”.26  
 
International partners also criticised the Declaration’s departure from the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The U.S. State Department was 
“deeply concerned that many of the ASEAN Declaration's principles and articles 
could weaken and erode universal human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
contained in the UDHR” (Nuland, 2012). Among the points raised were concerns 
over the use of the concept of ‘cultural relativism’, which appears to suggest that 
rights expressed in the UDHR do not apply everywhere, prioritising domestic laws 
                                                26	   Final	   Declaration	   of	   the	   Regional	   Meeting	   for	   Asia	   of	   the	   World	   Conference	   on	   Human	  Rights,	   1993.	   The	   declaration	   was	   adopted	   subsequent	   to	   the	   United	   Nation’s	   call	   for	   the	  establishment	   of	   regional	   mechanisms	   at	   the	   1993	   World	   Conference	   on	   Human	   Rights.	  Online	  (accessed	  14	  December	  2012):	  www.law.hku.hk/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline8/Bangkok%20Declaration.htm.	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over universal human rights; the conditionality of rights and the impression that 
individual rights could be subject to group veto (Nuland, 2012). The centrality of 
the state, questioned by many regional leaders such as Yusuf Wanandi, continues 
to outweigh the rights of the individual.  
 
ASEAN’s slow progress on developing an effective regional human rights 
mechanism reflects the challenge of finding a common ground, but the Declaration 
marks some progress, after all. The tension between ASEAN’s liberal agenda and 
the persistence of the ‘ASEAN Way’ continues to be an obstacle to strengthening 
cohesion and community-building. Yet many observers acknowledge the overall 
progress made. Kelsall (2009, p. 4) maintains that in combination with the 
ASEAN Charter and the Terms of Reference of the AICHR, the Declaration could 
promote “a more robust stance on human rights violations – particularly toward 
internal armed conflicts in the region”. Indeed, subtle changes in the language of 
the Declaration might indicate a change of attitude and that could facilitate more 
substantial changes in the long term. 
 
Significantly, the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights diverts from the ‘ASEAN 
Way’ by evading the sensitive principle of non-interference. The Declaration 
moves away from the principles of “respect for national sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of states”, which had still been 
emphasised in the Joint Communiqué of the 26th AMM subsequent to the World 
Conference on Human Rights in 1993.27 It instead reaffirms “the respect for and 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as 
the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance”.28 This 
parallels the omission of the principle of non-interference in another context, the 
framework for the APSC, which I will discuss below.  
 
For Jakarta, which has steadily promoted the liberal agenda to deepen regional 
integration and cohesion, and which has played a leading role in advancing the 
                                                27	  Article	   17	  of	   the	   “Joint	   Communiqué	  of	   the	  26th	  ASEAN	  Ministerial	  Meeting,”	   Singapore,	  23-­‐24	  July	  1993.	  	  28	   ASEAN	   Human	   Rights	   Declaration	   (2012),	   online	   (accessed	   30	   January	   2013):	  www.asean.org/news/asean-­‐statement-­‐communiques/item/asean-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐declaration	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regional human rights framework, this is a notable success in that the Declaration 
indicates a shift away from the language of non-interference in domestic affairs 
towards further regional integration. The Declaration thus bears witness not only 
to Indonesia’s role as an advocate for liberal democratic values. It further 
highlights once more the leadership role Jakarta assumes in pursuing an ASEAN 
community that reflects the aspirations of Indonesia’s political and intellectual 
elite. Moreover, while in the traditional security realm of defence cooperation 
progress is still slow, Jakarta has promoted closer security cooperation through the 
APSC via the less sensitive sphere of NTS, with the noteworthy engagement of 
China and other external powers. Following a discussion of the context of regional 
security in ASEAN and the changing significance of the non-interference norm, I 
will analyse how Indonesia’s approach to security regionalism reflects Jakarta’s 
role conceptions. 
 
The Security Context 
Security has been a core concern of ASEAN since its inception as the Association 
initially focused on consolidating the nation-state, for which the principles of the 
‘ASEAN Way’ and the norm of non-interference in particular provided a suitable 
framework. ASEAN’s founding document, the Bangkok Declaration, outlines the 
promotion of regional peace and stability as its main objectives and mentions 
security only in view of the extra-regional environment and the threat of 
interference in regional affairs.29 This obscured the fact that also within ASEAN, 
member states had to manage and contain threats to their national stability as these 
newly independent states were in the arduous process of consolidation and nation-
building, further aggravated by the Cold War context that considerably shaped 
both national and regional dynamics. In order to ascertain regional peace and 
stability, ASEAN’s foremost strategy was to strengthen the state and advance 
economic development and regional prosperity (Bellamy, 2004, p. 93; Bellamy & 
Drummond, 2011, p. 184; Rolls, 2012, p. 128).  
 
                                                29	  The	  ASEAN	  Declaration	  (Bangkok	  Declaration),	  1967,	  online:	  www.aseansec.org/1212.htm.	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Closer defence cooperation was not instituted in view of the perception this could 
have created in the volatile Cold War environment at the time. ASEAN’s founding 
members had considered deepening cooperation in security and defence to a level 
“short of a formal military alliance” (Rolls, 2012, p. 129). But the West-leaning 
founding members of the Association were concerned that Communist regimes in 
the wider region could have perceived the creation of a military pact as a threat 
(Acharya, 2000a, p. 26). A regional military bloc was further not considered 
necessary as most members of the Association entertained formal or de facto 
alliances. Thailand and the Philippines were tied to the U.S., and have, in the 
context of current geopolitical shifts, welcomed the U.S. initiative to reaffirm 
these ties. Singapore and Malaysia entered a pact with the UK, Australia and New 
Zealand in the Five Power Defence Agreement, which continues to be in force. 
Only Indonesia was non-aligned, in accordance with the country’s independent 
and active foreign policy doctrine. Among ASEAN members, cooperation in 
defence and security was limited to bilateral relationships (Acharya, 1990, 1991; 
Tomotaka, 2008, p. 19).  
 
The steps ASEAN initiated towards closer defence and security cooperation as 
part of the ASEAN community-building effort has created tensions with the norms 
entailed in the ‘ASEAN Way’. Criticism of the ‘ASEAN Way’ gained prominence 
in the 1990s, and the principles this concept entails are often credited with 
obstructing ASEAN regionalism. Yet they can equally be credited with having 
facilitated the framework within which ASEAN regionalism has been able to 
evolve. Regular and frequent interaction, the literally hundreds of meetings 
annually that have gained the grouping the questionable reputation of being a 
‘talk-shop’ have also strengthened the level of trust, comfort and confidence 
among regional state-makers and the bureaucracy, which helped shape a collective 
ASEAN identity.  
 
Adler and Barnett argued that such shared norms can have a transformative impact 
as they shape interstate relations, leading to the establishment of a security 
community, which is “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose 
people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler & Barnett, 
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1998a, p. 30). The case of ASEAN has been subject to a wide range of studies 
considering the applicability of the security community framework.30 Establishing 
a Southeast Asian security community has, in fact, been an early feature in 
ASEAN’s concept of regional order (Acharya, 1991, p. 161). Yet while there is a 
general consensus that ASEAN’s success in maintaining peace and stability in 
interstate affairs lends credit to the notion of a security community, within 
individual member states of this community conflict prevails, with at times 
potentially regional implications. 
 
ASEAN’s approach to engage with the domestic affairs of member states is only 
slowly changing. The principle of non-interference has been at the core of 
ASEAN’s ongoing struggle to effectively address regional security concerns 
(Emmerson, 2005, p. 176; Sukma, 2010a, p. 3). Internal conflicts are prevalent in 
the region and have regularly raised questions as to the Association’s 
accountability as it tends to refrain from addressing the domestic affairs of 
member states and the poor human rights record of regional governments. Open 
criticism, even comments on controversial domestic issues, is considered 
confrontational and not in the spirit of the ‘ASEAN Way’. This conundrum was 
most prominently demonstrated by ASEAN’s drawn-out engagement with Burma, 
which attracted considerable criticism and led to ruptures with many governments 
outside the region.  
 
The norm of non-interference was first challenged with ASEAN’s engagement in 
the Cambodian conflict (Acharya, 2000a, p. 115). ASEAN’s decision to intervene 
was based on the perceived need to ward off the Vietnamese threat to Thailand’s 
sovereignty and regional stability. Indonesia led the ASEAN initiative through 
then Foreign Minister Ali Alatas as the ASEAN Interlocutor on Cambodia, and 
hosted a round of ‘Jakarta Informal Meetings’ in 1988 and 1989. These meetings 
emphasised the role the UN had to play in resolving the conflict (Frost, 1991, p. 
                                                30	  According	   to	  Adler	  and	  Barnett’s	   (1998b)	   taxonomy,	  ASEAN	  did	  not	   follow	  the	  proposed	  progression	   as	   the	   Association	   has	   moved	   from	   a	   ‘nascent’	   security	   community	   (Acharya,	  2000,	   p.	   208)	   to	   a	   loosely-­‐coupled	  mature	   security	   community	   (Bellamy,	   2004,	   p.	   88)	   in	   a	  short	  period,	  apparently	  bypassing	  the	  ‘ascendant’	  stage.	  Adler	  and	  Barnett	  maintained	  that	  their	  framework	  is	  a	  mere	  heuristic	  device.	  ASEAN’s	  process	  of	  security	  community-­‐building	  does	   indeed	   defy	   a	   simplifying	   taxonomy	   (Acharya,	   1991;	   Caballero-­‐Anthony,	   2005;	  Emmerson,	  2005;	  Haacke,	  2005;	  Kuah,	  2004;	  Tomotaka,	  2008).	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20), underlining Indonesia’s support of an international system bound by rules and 
norms. Despite the difficulty of arriving at a solution, for ASEAN this experience 
demonstrated a shared commitment towards the region in the spirit of the ‘ASEAN 
Way’, even though the nature of ASEAN’s engagement contravened the norm of 
non-interference (Bellamy, 2004, p. 101).31 The intervention, which helped 
facilitate the 1991 peace agreement between Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge, 
was ASEAN’s first successful participation in a regional conflict resolution 
initiative, alongside Australia and the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council (Frost, 1991). The experience informed what was to become ASEAN’s 
preferred approach to regional peace and security through consultation, 
negotiation and diplomacy (Bellamy, 2004, pp. 99-100; Caballero-Anthony, 2005, 
p. 259).  
 
For Indonesia this could be considered a successful initiative in showcasing its 
capacity to lead the Association in addressing regional conflicts, a role Jakarta 
would consolidate a few years later when Indonesia facilitated the peace 
agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro National Liberation 
Front in 1996. These initiatives further highlighted the notion of Indonesia as 
mediator and bridge. These role types gain increased significance in view of 
Indonesia’s and ASEAN’s approach to addressing today’s changing security 
environment. 
 
ASEAN‘s role in managing regional security was transformed due to geopolitical 
shifts after the Cold War and the changing nature of security challenges, which 
were increasingly transnational in nature, requiring a concerted effort. A variety of 
traditional and NTS issues found their way onto the agenda of regional and extra-
regional dialogues, which underlined the need to set up a multilateral forum to 
facilitate dialogue and cooperation. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was 
established in 1994 with the objective of instituting ASEAN’s style of confidence-
building and preventive diplomacy across the wider Asia-Pacific region (Acharya, 
2000b, p. 147; Rolls, 2012, p. 131; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 22). Yet the forum did not 
make considerable progress towards developing a framework for preventive 
                                                31	  Cambodia	  had	  not	  yet	  joined	  the	  Association	  at	  the	  time.	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diplomacy. The slow pace with which it moved ahead, favouring consensus-based 
decision-making in adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’, frustrated many participants 
(Acharya, 2000b, p. 147). Moreover, the forum is predominantly attracting 
government representatives affiliated with their respective foreign ministries, 
lacking representatives from the defence and intelligence communities (Brandon, 
2002; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 23). The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), established in 
2002, aimed at addressing this gap. The SLD now is “Asia’s most prominent 
exercise in defence diplomacy” and brings together intelligence, security and 
defence officials from the ARF countries in one forum to raise common security 
issues (Capie & Taylor, 2010, p. 359). ASEAN was yet to establish a similar 
platform exclusive to the ten member grouping. 
 
Through the APSC framework, ASEAN has since advanced military-to-military 
ties through preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures along with a 
deepening of cooperation in the sphere of NTS, which stands to also advance 
traditional security cooperation. The APSC potentially is a significant step towards 
ASEAN cohesion. Indonesia’s leading role in the initiative underlines Jakarta’s 
strategy to consolidate its regional leadership status through ASEAN. This 
development gains added substance as with the ASEAN Defence Ministers 
Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) the APSC framework introduced an ASEAN-centred 
mechanism that can play an important role in further engaging external powers 
such as China in defence diplomacy and security cooperation. Following an 
outline of the APSC, I will analyse ASEAN’s approach to conflict resolution and 
Indonesia’s role therein, followed by a discussion on shifts in security cooperation 
in the NTS sphere.  
The	  ASEAN	  Political	  Security	  Community	  
The original proposal for the establishment of an ASEAN Security Community 
that Indonesia advanced in 2003 included several propositions that were met with 
considerable resistance from other ASEAN members. The main proposal outlining 
the creation of an APSC was adopted shortly after at the 9th ASEAN Summit with 
the signing of the Bali Concord II. The Bali Concord II outlined member states’ 
commitment to the components of norm-setting, conflict prevention, conflict 
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resolution, post-conflict peace-building and the establishment of an ASEAN 
Political Security Community by 2020, a target that was later moved forward to 
2015.32  
 
The Bali Concord II reflected Indonesia’s concept of ‘comprehensive security’, 
which entails both aspects of traditional and non-traditional security within the 
context of the adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’. The more contested elements of 
Jakarta’s proposal, such as a regional human rights mechanism and the 
establishment of a regional peacekeeping force, were rejected at the time. The Bali 
Concord II reiterated ASEAN member countries’ “rights to lead their national 
existence free from outside interference in their internal affairs”.33 This continued 
adherence to the ‘ASEAN Way’ was seen as obstructing ASEAN security 
regionalism and was criticised as “more of the same” (Rolls, 2012, p. 132).34 
ASEAN’s preferred style of governance “at a pace comfortable to all” also 
underlined the Association’s reluctance to move Jakarta’s proposals ahead, due to 
resistance from other regional governments.35  
 
Following the objectives expressed in the Bali Concord II, the 2004 Vientiane 
Action Programme further advanced the gradual institutionalization of confidence-
building measures and multilateral security cooperation.36 The ASEAN Defence 
Ministers Meeting (ADMM, established in 2006) and the ADMM-Plus 
(established in 2010) have since become central platforms for advancing defence 
diplomacy and security cooperation in ASEAN as well as with dialogue partners, 
including the U.S. and China.37 The ADMM promotes “regional peace and 
stability through dialogue and cooperation in defence and security” by means of 
military-to-military interaction.38 Field exercises under the ADMM “provide 
                                                32	  Declaration	  of	  ASEAN	  Concord	  II	  (Bali	  Concord	  II),	  online:	  www.aseansec.org/15159.htm.	  	  33	  Bali	  Concord	  II,	  p.	  3.	  34	  See	  also	  (Emmerson,	  2005,	  p.	  179;	  Kuah,	  2004;	  Smith,	  2004,	  p.	  423;	  Sukma,	  2008,	  p.	  138;	  Tomotaka,	  2008,	  p.	  30).	  	  35	  Bali	  Concord	  II,	  p.	  3.	  36	  Vientiane	  Action	  Programme,	  2004,	  online:	  	  www.aseansec.org/VAP-­‐10th%20ASEAN%20Summit.pdf.	  	  37	   The	   ADMM-­‐Plus	   includes	   ASEAN	   dialogue	   partners	   Australia,	   China,	   India,	   Japan,	   the	  Republic	  of	  Korea,	  New	  Zealand,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	  38	  See	  ‘Concept	  Paper	  for	  the	  Establishment	  of	  an	  ASEAN	  Defence	  Ministers	  Meeting’,	  online:	  http://www.aseansec.org/18511.htm.	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platforms for ASEAN militaries to interact with the Plus countries’ militaries in 
responding to common threats in the region”, which includes Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), terrorism and maritime security.39 The 
ADMM is to date the main mechanism for multilateral defence cooperation in 
ASEAN and it aims to reaffirm ASEAN centrality in regional order and security. 
Indonesian Defence Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro emphasised in 2011 that 
“ASEAN's centrality must remain the working basis manifested through the 
increased performance of the ADMM” ("ASEAN must maintain centrality in 
programs: Indonesian minister," 2011). Jakarta considers these and other 
multilateral frameworks suitable mechanisms to address some of the most 
protracted issues in the region. 
 
By addressing maritime security, the ADMM framework also opens opportunities 
to take up the disputes with China in the South China Sea. At the 2012 Shangri-La 
Dialogue, Yusgiantoro affirmed Jakarta’s support of the rule of law in managing 
maritime issues by acknowledging the significance of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to Yusgiantoro, the 
UNCLOS “is like an international constitution in the maritime domain, which we 
expect to be adhered to by the international community”, a clear affirmation of 
Indonesia’s role conception as responsible member of the international system and 
example in the region, as well as a message to Beijing, which despite having 
ratified the Convention in 1996, continues to insist on its historical claims (Malig, 
2012). But also within ASEAN, regional mechanisms to directly address conflict 
have yet to be fully realised and Indonesia is a leading proponent of related 
developments, underlining its role conceptions of mediator/integrator and regional 
sub-system collaborator. 
Towards	  a	  Regional	  Mechanism	  for	  Conflict	  Resolution	  
On several occasions in the 1970s and 1980s the possibility of a regional military 
arrangement, including a ‘joint command’, had been raised (Acharya, 1991, p. 
161), but ASEAN is yet to find common ground in regional defence cooperation. 
                                                39	   ASEAN	   Defence	   Ministers	   reflect	   on	   way	   forward	   in	   2013,	   online	   (accessed	   30	   January	  2013):	   www.asean.org/news/asean-­‐secretariat-­‐news/item/asean-­‐defence-­‐ministers-­‐reflect-­‐on-­‐way-­‐forward-­‐for-­‐2013	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The notion that ASEAN does not need a common defence pact in fact persists to 
this day (Sukma, 2010b, p. 21). This is a major shortcoming towards developing a 
regional mechanism for conflict resolution. Jakarta’s 2003 proposition for such a 
mechanism entailed the proposal for a peacekeeping force that could help address 
regional and internal conflicts (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004; Kuah, 2004). At the 
time, other ASEAN members rejected the idea of a regional force (Bandoro, 2004; 
Chongkittavorn, 2004; Kuah, 2004). Vietnam’s Foreign Minister (cited in 
Acharya, 2005, p. 149) argued that political and military policies were not 
sufficiently compatible for such a level of cooperation and considered the idea 
“too early”. Singapore’s Foreign Minister (cited in Acharya, 2005; and Kuah, 
2004, p. 4) claimed that ASEAN was the “wrong entity to play a peacekeeping 
role”, pointing out that the grouping was not a security or defence organisation. 
Thailand’s Foreign Affairs Minister rejected the idea of an ASEAN force as 
unnecessary, arguing that there were no conflicts in the region that would justify 
the mobilisation of such a force (Kuah, 2004, p. 2).  
 
The resistance to Indonesia’s proposal of closer traditional security cooperation 
indicated latent antagonism among members of the Association, where mutual 
distrust and competition persists. ASEAN is yet to successfully resolve border 
disputes on the Southeast Asian mainland, such as the conflict between Cambodia 
and Thailand, as well as territorial disputes in the South China Sea, among others, 
(Acharya, 1991, pp. 173-174; 2000a, p. 128ff; 2000b, p. 137; Alexandra, 2011; 
"ASEAN, preventive diplomacy and bilateral conflict," 2011; Bandoro, 2004; 
Sukma, 2011d). Previous efforts to create mechanisms to address such issues have 
thus far failed, evident in the yet to be utilised High Council mandated in the 1976 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that was again put forward in the APSC 
framework (Acharya, 2000b, p. 128; Tomotaka, 2008, p. 21; Woon, 2011). 
Regional solutions to regional problems might not always be the option preferred 
by all members.  
 
The resistance to Jakarta’s proposition also reaffirmed regional adherence to the 
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of member states. Rizal Sukma, 
who was instrumental in drafting and presenting the original proposal to ASEAN 
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leaders, later conceded that Indonesia had not taken the issue of non-interference 
sufficiently into account to pre-empt these concerns. Sukma further pointed out 
that at the time Indonesia did not intend to question the principle per se, but that 
Jakarta favoured a more flexible interpretation of non-interference that would 
allow the Association to address some of the region’s persistent internal security 
issues (Khalik, 2003). This episode again highlighted the tension between the 
‘ASEAN Way’ and efforts by regional governments and think tanks to adapt these 
principles, and the norm of non-interference in particular, to a changing security 
environment (Sukma, 2011c, p. 119). Prior to Indonesia’s proposal, Malaysia’s 
Anwar Ibrahim and Thailand’s Surin Pitsuwan had attempted to reinterpret 
ASEAN’s founding principles. Their concepts of ‘constructive intervention’ and 
‘flexible engagement’, respectively, met with considerable resistance at the time 
(Acharya, 2005, p. 150; Bellamy, 2004, p. 97; Haacke, 2005). Acharya (2005, p. 
149) thus observed that “the most significant barrier to peace operations in Asia 
[…] is normative [sic]”.  
 
In an effort to overcome these divisions and move core elements of their proposal 
ahead, Indonesia instead suggested the establishment of peacekeeping centres in a 
revised proposal. By emphasising the role of UN-led missions and disaster relief 
for regional peacekeepers, Indonesia thus avoided the contentious notion of 
regional intervention in domestic conflicts.40 For most ASEAN member countries, 
these objectives were better aligned with more popular priorities in regional non-
traditional security cooperation, as peacekeeping missions with increasingly 
complex mandates nowadays have to meet a range of objectives, including 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) (Uesugi, 2004). Jakarta thus 
refrained from explicitly implicating the potential of such an initiative for 
traditional security cooperation within ASEAN. Sugeng Raharjo, a former 
Indonesian foreign ministry official (cited in "Indonesia modifies peacekeeping 
proposal after ASEAN reservations," 2004), suggested that “[t]he wording was 
changed but the spirit is the same”. Although Indonesia’s desire to consolidate its 
role conception of mediator in regional conflicts would require the Association to 
advance the concept of a regional mechanism for conflict resolution, the inclusion 
                                                40	  ASEAN	  Defense	  Ministers’	  Meeting	  (ADMM),	  Concept	  Paper	  on	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  Establishment	  of	  ASEAN	  Peacekeeping	  Centres	  Network,	  online:	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of a network of peacekeeping centres was a small, yet not insignificant, step 
towards further advancing security cooperation in the region. 
 
ASEAN has recently begun to move beyond rhetorical commitments towards 
advancing the regional peacekeeping initiative. The 2009 APSC Roadmap refers 
to the idea of establishing “an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace 
and stability”.41 This objective had already been laid out in the 2004 Vientiane 
Action Programme and thus does not constitute a substantial development. But the 
language of the 2009 APSC Roadmap departs from the 2007 ASEAN Charter, 
which had already indicated a more flexible interpretation of non-interference vis-
à-vis the achievement of collective goals (Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 189). 
The Roadmap makes no mention of the norm of non-interference, a notable 
change in view of its security context and a precursor to the omission noted above 
in the context of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. Instead it indicates the 
possibility of regional initiatives to “strengthen efforts in maintaining respect for 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of ASEAN Member States [by] 
addressing threats and challenges that may affect the territorial integrity of 
ASEAN Member States including those posed by separatism”.42  
 
The establishment of such a mechanism to promote peace and stability within 
ASEAN is as relevant as ever. Territorial spats between Thailand and Cambodia as 
well as the conflict between Rohingya Muslims and Rakhine Buddhists in Arakan 
province in Western Burma have again highlighted the prevalence of conflict 
within ASEAN and the inadequacy of ASEAN’s management of these issues. 
Indonesia has been at the forefront of trying to mediate in both cases. Jakarta has 
had observers on standby to be deployed to the Thai-Cambodian border 
(International Crisis Group, 2011). The possibility of Indonesian observers in 
Myanmar has been floated in light of the crisis in that country, and former vice 
president Yusuf Kalla, who was instrumental in facilitating the peace agreement 
with the Free Aceh Movement, led relief efforts in Arakan province ("Jusuf Kalla 
welcomed to visit Myanmar conflict site," 2012). These conflicts have also raised 
                                                41	  ASEAN	  Roadmap,	  p.	  14.	  42	  ASEAN	  Roadmap,	  p.13.	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renewed calls for an ASEAN peacekeeping force ("Asean peacekeepers for 
Myanmar?," 2012; F. Pitsuwan, 2011).  
 
Yet while progress towards such a mechanism is cumbersome, initiatives towards 
capability development are promising as ASEAN alludes to the “view to 
developing a regional arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability”.43 
In 2011, ASEAN defence ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN Peacekeeping 
Training Centre Network to facilitate planning, training and exchange of 
experience in order “to contribute to peacekeeping efforts in the world”.44 The 
institutionalisation of peacekeeping capabilities in the region is a significant step 
towards closer security cooperation, and with the slow erosion of the non-
interference norm could indicate a change of attitude towards closer traditional 
security cooperation. 
 
Many regional governments acknowledge the value of participating in multilateral 
peace operations under UN auspices, to advance their international standing, 
multilateral diplomacy and defence capabilities. Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines have substantially increased their contributions to UNPKO since 2003. 
Jakarta’s contributions have increased most significantly, and Indonesia intends to 
be among the top-ten contributing countries to UNPKO by 2020 (Luftia, 2012b), a 
goal that befits Jakarta’s ‘international identity’ and the notion of Indonesia as a 
model, mediator and global actor. Indonesia’s participation in UNPKO is said to 
be beneficial to advancing Indonesia’s diplomacy by building and improving 
relations with other members of the international community. Sukma (2010b, p. 
23) also suggests that participation in such missions can help professionalise the 
military, which could have a positive impact on its capacity to approach the 
management of domestic conflicts. 
 
Thailand’s contributions dropped after the 2006 military coup but recouped in 
2010 and have since increased. Since deploying several hundred peacekeepers to 
                                                43	  ADMM	  Joint	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  19	  May	  2011.	  44	   Indonesian	   Defence	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   cited	   in	   "Defense	   ministers	   discuss	  plan	  to	  establish	  joint	  peacekeeping	  network,"	  2011.	  See	  also	  Joint	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  of	  the	  ASEAN	  Defence	  Ministers	  on	  Strengthening	  Defence	  Cooperation	  of	  ASEAN	  in	  the	  Global	  Community	  to	  Face	  New	  Challenges,	  Jakarta,	  19	  May	  2011,	  online:	  www.aseansec.org/26304.htm.	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UNPKO in East Timor, Singapore’s contribution has been modest. Cambodia has 
contributed steadily since 2004. Brunei started contributing modest numbers of 
peacekeepers in 2006.45 Vietnam first expressed support for UNPKO in 2006, 
which signalled a significant shift in attitude towards the UN. Hanoi is yet to 
contribute peacekeepers to UNPKO, which might be due to political opposition as 
much as it is to capabilities ("Vietnam mulls participation in U.N. peacekeeping 
force," 2006). In developing its peacekeeping capacity Vietnam is also deepening 
bilateral relationships with extra-regional partners ("Australia expands military 
influence in Vietnam," 2012; "Vietnam, Bangladesh strengthen defence 
cooperation," 2012).  
 
In 2010, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand established 
the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centre Association, a pro-active step towards the 
establishment of the ASEAN Peacekeeping Centres Network that was endorsed by 
the ADMM in 2011.46 Myanmar and Laos are yet to participate in this 
development. But the shift is obvious. Carlyle Thayer of the Australian Defence 
Force Academy (cited in "Vietnam mulls participation in U.N. peacekeeping 
force," 2006) suggests that “[th]ere is normative pressure building up regionally in 
support of peacekeeping under U.N. auspices”.  
 
These initiatives will also benefit from developments at the level of multilateral 
mechanisms such as the ADMM-Plus and the ARF. Member countries of the ARF 
have conducted annual Peacekeeping Expert Meetings since 2007, focusing on 
capacity building, civil-military cooperation and regional cooperation in 
peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief.47 At the ADMM-Plus meeting in Hanoi in 2010 defence ministers 
agreed to establish a Peacekeeping Operations Working Group, which focuses on 
                                                45	  UN	  Peacekeeping	  Statistics,	  online:	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  46	  See	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  on	  the	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  of	  ASEAN	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  Network	  and	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  19	  May	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  of	   the	  4th	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  Thailand	  11-­‐12	  March	  2010,	  online:	  www.aseanregionalforum.asean.org.	  	  	  
  69 
identifying capability gaps as well as opportunities for collaboration to enhance 
member states’ contributions to peacekeeping operations.48  
 
While ASEAN-wide initiatives continue to focus on peace operations under UN 
auspices and in areas of NTS, regional peace operations highlight the potential of a 
regional arrangement for conflict resolution, moreover as peacekeeping operations 
globally increasingly target internal conflicts. Indonesia’s original proposal 
suggested the establishment of ‘standby arrangements’ for a peacekeeping force as 
a “maximum security response […] that could one day help settle disputes such as 
those in Aceh and the southern Philippines” (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). One such 
example is the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Mindanao in the Southern 
Philippines. The IMT was established in 2004 under the Government – Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of 
Hostilities (CCCH) and has since been credited with successfully reducing the 
number of ceasefire violations (Bendahara & Au, 2012). In October 2012, in view 
of a final peace agreement, a Philippine government representative raised the idea 
of an international peacekeeping force through the existing IMT structure to 
facilitate demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the armed 
forces of the MILF (Arguillas, 2012). The mission’s success is also due to the 
favourable conditions of the constellation. Both Malaysia and Indonesia, which 
contribute a substantial share of the peacekeepers, have played significant roles in 
mediating conflicts in Central Mindanao.49 Malaysia was the facilitator of the 
recently negotiated agreement between the MILF and Manila. Indonesia had 
facilitated the peace agreement between the Philippine Government and the Moro 
National Liberation Front in 1996. The success of the IMT in facilitating 
conditions conducive to the peace agreement adds credibility to Indonesia’s 
proposal for a regional force and further clout to Jakarta’s role conceptions of 
mediator, bridge, regional sub-system collaborator and leader. 
 
                                                48	   See	   Statement	  by	   the	  Department	  of	  National	  Defense,	  Republic	   of	   the	  Philippines,	   ‘DND	  Conducts	   Peacekeeping	   Workshop’,	   online:	   www.dndph.org/2012-­‐press-­‐releases/dnd-­‐conducts-­‐peacekeeping-­‐workshop.	  49	   The	   IMT’s	   Security	   Component	   currently	   includes	   nine	   peacekeepers	   from	  Malaysia,	   15	  peacekeepers	   from	   Brunei,	   13	   peacekeepers	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   Indonesia	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   peacekeeper	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  Norway.	  See	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  http://imtmindanao.org.	  	  
  70 
It would be instructive, however, to test Jakarta’s commitment to such an initiative 
by scrutinising the government’s handling of the conflict in Papua and West 
Papua. Considering Jakarta’s current security approach in the provinces, it would 
appear that the deeper level of security cooperation Indonesia pursues at the 
ASEAN level could well contradict its national interest in the context of Papua if 
ASEAN neighbours push for a regional intervention to address the conflict. It 
could be argued that Indonesia’s desire to consolidate its ‘international identity’ 
and regional leadership credentials outweighs its domestic concerns, unless Jakarta 
is confident that its political weight in the Association allows it to restrict regional 
interference in its own domestic affairs, while it projects its credentials as mediator 
and bridge in other regional conflicts. 
 
Beyond ASEAN, peacekeeping further is a potential area of convergence with 
Beijing, as also China has become a noteworthy contributor to UNPKO. Since 
China has been admitted to the United Nations in 1971, the country’s approach to 
security cooperation at the UN level has undergone a remarkable transition from 
outright resistance to UNPKO, to contributing troops since 1989, to becoming the 
largest contributor of personnel among the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council. This shift has attracted considerable attention and there is a rich 
body of work that analyses China’s participation in UNPKO, in view of the 
country’s official adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and non-
intervention (Gill & James, 2000; Liu, 2012), China’s worldview and 
modernisation discourse (Davis, 2002; Suzuki, 2011), Beijing’s efforts to respond 
to the ‘China threat’ perception by demonstrating the country’s peaceful 
intentions, and attempts to building the profile of a responsible global citizen 
concerned with maintaining regional and global peace and security (Richardson, 
2011). In 2007, when ASEAN was yet to make notable progress on its own 
regional initiative, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao hosted a China-ASEAN 
peacekeeping workshop, indicating Beijing’s desire to cooperate ("Chinese 
premier announces plan for China-ASEAN peace-keeping workshop," 2007).  
 
It is in the area of NTS, however, where security and defence cooperation between 
ASEAN and China is most advanced, providing Jakarta with an opportunity to 
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engage Beijing in an effort to consolidate ASEAN centrality and Indonesian 
leadership. Furthermore, Indonesia’s promotion of a regional force has been most 
successful in this security context. 
Non-­Traditional	  Security	  Cooperation	  
The area of NTS advances a deepening of military cooperation at the ASEAN 
level as well as with China and other external powers outside the contentious 
context of traditional security. The 2009 APSC Roadmap, reflecting Indonesia’s 
proposal for ‘comprehensive security’, obliges ASEAN member states to create a 
“cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for 
comprehensive security […] which goes beyond the requirements of traditional 
security but also takes into account non-traditional aspects vital to regional and 
national resilience”.50 The range of natural disasters that struck Southeast Asia in 
recent years, from tsunamis to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, forest fires, 
landslides and flooding has added to the sense of urgency to advance regional 
cooperation in this area.  
 
Cooperation on NTS advances regional military-to-military ties through joint 
training, operations and exercises, including at the level of the ARF, APT and 
between China and ASEAN. Indeed, the partnership between ASEAN and China 
in the area of NTS has been highlighted as the potentially most effective approach 
to date to address the abundance of regional security challenges. Arase (2010) 
suggests Sino–ASEAN cooperation in NTS has already become an 
institutionalized process that affects both the strategic and political future of East 
Asia. The NTS agenda is set to become the platform on which to advance 
traditional security cooperation as it is “redefining perceptions and pushing the 
boundaries of security cooperation at regional and global levels” (Morton, 2011). 
 
The NTS agenda might further help advance the intractable debate on the modus 
operandi of the ‘ASEAN Way’, which hitherto had been framed within traditional 
security concerns by taking a more functionalist approach towards regional 
security. ASEAN’s experience with a range of NTS challenges such as natural and 
                                                50	  ASEAN	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man-made disasters initiated a gradual shift towards a more qualified form of 
sovereignty that allows some degree of interference. Sukma (2008, p. 147) argues 
that while the doctrine of non-interference continues to remain relevant, it needs to 
be interpreted in the context of member states’ interdependence and their 
vulnerability to transboundary issues and spill-over effects of domestic events in 
member countries. Caballero-Anthony and Haywood (2011, p. 7) also note a 
gradual shift in attitudes towards the principles of state sovereignty and non-
interference with ‘regional’ security concerns at times outweighing concerns over 
‘interference’. They conclude “the ‘ASEAN way’ itself is not an entirely static 
concept and what is considered interference in the domestic affairs of a country is 
an ever-widening notion” (Caballero-Anthony & Haywood, 2011, p. 5).  
 
These dynamics were most evident in ASEAN’s – albeit belated – response to the 
Cyclone Nargis that hit parts of Myanmar in 2008. Former ASEAN Secretary 
General Surin Pitsuwan (2008, p. xx) considered Nargis a defining moment for 
ASEAN. ASEAN’s engagement opened the debate on the implications of threats 
to human security and how the Association should respond to such threats vis-à-
vis the prerogative of non-interference, thus advancing notions that had previously 
been raised by members of the EPG during the drafting of the ASEAN Charter. 
Nargis triggered the largest humanitarian operation ever coordinated by ASEAN. 
The grouping, therein Indonesia and Singapore specifically, successfully mediated 
between the Burmese regime and international aid donors, diminishing fears of 
political intervention to manage the humanitarian crisis (Emmerson, 2008a, p. 45). 
Some analysts went so far as to suggest that the cyclone “transformed Myanmar 
from ASEAN’s embarrassment into its opportunity” as the Association’s intimacy 
with the regime was said to have been an asset in the aftermath of the disaster 
(Bellamy & Drummond, 2011, p. 191; Emmerson, 2008b, p. 45).  
 
Some observers proclaimed that ASEAN found a new purpose with the response 
to Nargis in building up its regional capacity to respond to future disasters 
(Baldwin, 2009). The experience at least highlighted the need for mechanisms to 
facilitate a coordinated regional response to such events, though earlier regional 
disasters, such as the haze that became a frequent occurrence since the late 1990s 
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and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami could have equally triggered a more 
comprehensive coordinated regional response. It is likely that only the efforts of 
advancing ASEAN’s liberal agenda and security cooperation provided the 
framework within which ASEAN could at last take concerted action in the 
aftermath of cyclone Nargis.  
 
ASEAN’s response to the disaster was a notable step towards closer ASEAN 
security cooperation and coordination. The response to Nargis also illustrated the 
importance of cooperation with non-state actors and civil-military coordination. 
Initiatives such as this potentially widen the security discourse in the region, 
acknowledging the significance of a pluralistic response to security challenges, 
which could further erode the Westphalian logic of state-centred security 
(Emmerson, 2008b; Sukma, 2008, p. 147). ASEAN Secretary-General Surin 
Pitsuwan optimistically declared “[t]his is the New ASEAN – a community that 
puts people at the centre of concern” (S. Pitsuwan, 2008, p. xx). ASEAN is yet to 
achieve the people-centrism propagated by regional leaders such as Wanandi. But 
the response to Nargis exemplified ASEAN’s efforts at “working around the 
sensitivities to external interference and avoiding charges of intrusion by 
emphasising the cooperative character of the NTS agenda in which sovereignty is 
not trumped or superseded, but rather, pooled” (Caballero-Anthony, 2005, p. 266; 
2008, p. 207). Since ASEAN’s experience with the Nargis response, this approach 
has been further institutionalised. 
 
In 2009, the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency 
Response (AADMER) came into force, four years after its ratification and without 
a doubt due also to ASEAN’s previous experience with the Nargis response. The 
legally binding disaster mitigation mechanism draws from the lessons learned and 
constitutes a “proactive regional framework for cooperation, coordination, 
technical assistance, and resource mobilisation in all aspects of disaster 
management”.51 ASEAN had begun drafting the agreement in 2004, several weeks 
before the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. ASEAN Foreign Ministers ratified the 
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agreement in July 2005, but it took more than four years for it to come into effect 
and since then overall progress has been criticised as too slow in view of the 
frequent disasters in the region (Amul, 2012). 
 
The agreement is the most significant step yet towards a more functional level of 
security cooperation. Article 9 of the AADMER mandates the establishment of an 
ASEAN Standby Arrangement for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
(HADR) deployed on a voluntary basis and based on the state’s capabilities.52 In 
the 2011 ADMM declaration, defence ministers adopted the idea of the use of 
military assets and capacities for HADR operations.53 The establishment of the 
standby arrangement is perceived a matter of urgency that requires the acceleration 
of “the effective operations of the ASEAN military in HADR operations 
regionally and internationally […] to minimise loss to live and property due to 
natural and man-made disasters, while respecting the sovereignty of the affected 
State”.54 Indonesia and Singapore co-hosted the first ASEAN HADR Table-Top 
Exercise (ASEAN HADR TTX) in July 2011 as a step towards practical 
cooperation of ASEAN militaries.55 The second HADR TTX will be hosted by 
Brunei in 2013, possibly in the South China Sea “in order to promote trust and 
compatibilities between member nations” ("ASEAN HADR exercise next year," 
2012). The attendance of the Chinese defence minister at the 6th ADMM in Phnom 
Penh in 2012, where the exercise was proposed, highlights the convergence of 
NTS cooperation and defence diplomacy and cooperation in ASEAN and with 
China ("ASEAN HADR exercise next year," 2012). 
 
For Indonesia the development of this mechanism could be considered another 
modest success towards a collective security arrangement that along with the 
establishment of a regional mechanism for conflict resolution stands to advance 
security and defence cooperation and thus ASEAN cohesion, reflecting positively 
on Indonesia’s role in advancing these initiatives. The establishment in 2011 of the 
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ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster 
Management (AHA Centre) in Jakarta was not merely for practical reasons.56 The 
fact that also the ASEAN Secretariat is located in Jakarta along with the proposed 
location for the ASEAN Peacekeeping Training Centre in Sentul/Bogor near 
Jakarta is a strong symbol of the central role Indonesia intends to play in managing 
the Association’s numerous issue areas. The AHA Centre serves as the hub for 
coordinated disaster response, akin the UN’s Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and will likely coordinate initiatives that also 
involve partners from beyond the ASEAN region, adding another dimension to 
Indonesia’s efforts of being “part of the solution” in NTS cooperation and beyond 
(Natalegawa, cited in Cullum, 2010). 
 
Although it is too soon to determine the effectiveness of the AADMER, some 
aspects should raise questions about the feasibility of making the mechanism work 
in the near future. The establishment of the AHA Centre is the principal 
achievement to date but operationalising the initiative remains slow. So far, 
progress towards the standby arrangement has been limited to the on-going 
identification of member states’ assets and capacities, but policy, legal and 
financial infrastructure is still lacking. The implementation of the AADMER work 
programme is the primary responsibility of member states, which have to develop 
the policy and legal environment at the national level to facilitate the 
establishment of necessary structures and mechanisms for implementation, 
coordination and enforcement.57 Without a definite timeframe these processes will 
take time to be completed. Voluntary contributions by ASEAN member states, 
“preferably on a regular basis”, along with contributions from dialogue partners 
are meant to finance the implementation of the AADMER work programme.58 
Without secure funding, the viability of the mechanism cannot be ascertained. 
Also the voluntary nature of the standby arrangement should not surprise critics of 
ASEAN’s modus operandi. The ‘ASEAN Way’ still sets the pace for the 
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development of a mechanism that provides the clearest outline yet for a regional 
force.  
 
Resistance from within the Association’s less progressive governments has 
continuously bogged down progress, raising questions as to whether Indonesia 
should look beyond ASEAN. The slow pace at which ASEAN operates and the 
obstacles its style of governance presents to Indonesian initiatives have 
contributed to growing criticism of the Association in Indonesia, where decision-
makers and intellectuals put forward the idea of looking towards a more globally 
oriented foreign policy (Rüland, 2009, p. 399; Sukma, 2009a). ASEAN’s 
relevance to Indonesia as a vehicle to realise Jakarta’s regional and global 
ambitions cannot be overstated. The benefits Indonesia derives from its 
commitments towards advancing ASEAN integration hinges on the Association’s 
success in strengthening cohesion and projecting the image of a strong regional 
grouping. A regional force for conflict resolution and HADR would be a powerful 
statement of ASEAN cohesion and community with Indonesia at its helm. For 
Jakarta, whose 2003 proposal provided the framework for these initiatives, the 
institutionalisation of security and defence cooperation within ASEAN and, 
moreover, with China, is likely regarded as a success, as it emphasises Indonesia’s 
role in shaping the regional order, adding clout to its image as a positive influence 
on regional affairs. 
 
It is in Indonesia’s interest to ensure that these initiatives move ahead in due 
course. More importantly, in advancing regional security cooperation Jakarta will 
be on alert to pre-empt ASEAN from exposing existing divisions in the grouping, 
as demonstrated by Indonesia’s response to the recent failure of agreeing on a joint 
communiqué at the 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phnom Penh. The 
incident sparked an immediate debate as to whether ASEAN’s future was at stake 
("Cambodia has put Asean's future in jeopardy," 2012). China’s role in this 
incident only underscores Jakarta’s concern and explains Indonesia’s rapid 
response to manage the situation.  
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Jakarta’s role conceptions of model, bridge, mediator, and sub-system collaborator 
are all geared towards ascertaining ASEAN’s potential as a regional platform to 
advance Indonesia’s leadership ambitions. The country’s policy and intellectual 
elite has been instrumental in promoting and embedding liberal norms and values 
within the regional framework of governance, and the Association has arguably 
made significant steps towards further integration. Yet divisions remain, and the 
China factor at times weighs heavily on regional relationships, with potentially 
damaging implications for the ASEAN Community idea. A weak and indecisive 
ASEAN could be detrimental to the realisation of Indonesia’s role conception as 
regional leader and global actor.  
 
But Indonesia’s continued commitment to advancing its agenda at the ASEAN 
level is not guaranteed, as it is subject to possible shifts in domestic politics. 
Before concluding, I intend to touch on possible future scenarios of Indonesia’s 
regional and global role. 
Quo	  vadis,	  Indonesia?	  
Indonesia’s liberal agenda has been a constant feature of ASEAN regionalism for 
the past decade, driven by domestic political changes and dedicated individuals. 
The policy and intellectual elite that advances democratisation of the regional 
sphere shares its foreign policy objectives of regional leadership and global 
influence with neo-nationalist elements that are concerned about China’s rise and 
its implications for Jakarta’s ambitions. Despite an Islamic resurgence in the social 
sphere and associated domestic political developments that could potentially 
threaten Indonesia’s pluralism, the government has thus far not capitalised on this 
identity and is unlikely to do so to any significant degree, as political Islam is not 
popular among the pluralist majority. Yet political changes could usher in subtle 
shifts that could also inform Indonesia’s foreign policy behaviour.  
 
Aras and Gorener (2010, p. 90) conclude “the dominance of a particular [role] 
conception has to do with the domestic political balance of power and leadership 
skills”. Indonesia’s championing of a liberal agenda sits well with progressive 
leaders such as Yudhoyono and Natalegawa. But “[r]ole theory allows for the 
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exercise of individuality” (Holsti, 1970, p. 298) and it remains to be seen whether 
a potential Prabowo administration would be equally supportive of ASEAN’s 
liberal turn if it fails to appreciate the effect this has on Indonesia’s regional and 
global ambitions, or if it perceives national interests to outweigh regional and 
international objectives. Indonesia’s changing political party structure means that 
policy will increasingly be elite- and personality-driven, rather than building on 
well-established party platforms with more predictable policy outcomes 
(Syailendra, 2012; Trajano & Kenawas, 2013; Ufen, 2006). The continued 
presence of members of the old elite among Indonesia’s policy and intelligence 
community also indicates that now and for some time still Indonesia’s liberal 
forces and authoritarian elements will continue to create tensions within the 
domestic sphere. Whether these potential shifts could alter Jakarta’s foreign policy 
outlook in any considerable way is questionable, however. Since embarking on its 
process of democratisation, Jakarta foreign policy has been marked by continuity. 
This is unlikely to change as Indonesia’s current foreign policy approach and 
predominant role conception is in the interest also of the country’s neo-nationalist 
forces. 
 
Its national role conceptions as model for liberal democracy, bridge and 
mediator/integrator provide a suitable context for Indonesia’s liberal agenda, but it 
is its role conception as regional leader and global player that predominantly 
determines this foreign policy behaviour. Other ASEAN governments that 
promote the liberal agenda should equally be questioned in their motivation. 
Emmerson (2007, p. 8) argues that ASEAN’s interest in promoting liberal 
democracy is almost exclusively instrumental, not led by a commitment to 
democracy on ideal grounds in its own right. Rüland (2009, p. 396), while 
acknowledging processes of democratisation in most ASEAN countries, highlights 
the role played by ‘old’ national elites that pursue a neo-nationalist agenda, which 
benefits from the democratisation discourse purportedly championed by regional 
governments. Also Jetschke (1999) argues that Indonesia’s human rights rhetoric 
serves the agenda of the country’s nationalist elements. Carothers and Youngs 
(2011, p. 19) question “the idea that international democracy support is not 
intrinsically a pro-Western policy cause but rather an endeavor that can advance 
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the national interests of non-Western countries whose foreign policy goals overall 
are very different from those in the West”. Emerging democracies, they assert, 
“are more interested in increasing their own power vis-à-vis regional rivals than in 
seeing a more democratic world” (Carothers & Youngs, 2011, p. 25).   
 
In view of Indonesia’s questionable commitment to its ‘core values’ of democracy 
and human rights (Anwar, 2010b, p. 132) in the domestic sphere, this observation 
seems apt. Considering progress made towards institutionalising a liberal agenda 
at the regional level and towards softening the norm of non-interference it raises 
the possibility, however, that democratic norms and values might ‘trickle down’ 
from a liberalised ASEAN into the domestic sphere, rather than ‘diffuse’ from the 
domestic sphere to the region as argued by Dosch (2008, p. 530).  
 
Promoting liberal democracy is nonetheless a pivotal part of Indonesia’s strategy 
to raise its regional and global image, and an asset when it comes to looking 
beyond ASEAN to realise Jakarta’s ambitions. There is growing discontent among 
civil society and members of Indonesia’s foreign policy and intellectual elite about 
ASEAN’s slow progress (Anwar, 2010b, p. 134). If ASEAN’s progress continues 
to drag, Indonesia might well decide to look beyond this ‘golden cage’ (Sukma, 
2009a).59 India, another middle-power in the immediate neighbourhood, could be a 
natural partner on the global stage. Both states are emerging regional powers, 
members of the G20, the ARF and the ADMM-Plus. They are proponents of 
South-South cooperation and have historically been advocates of a liberal 
democratic order that, according to Mohan (2011), has more credibility than the 
‘liberal imperialism’ of the West. The history of the Indian-Indonesian relationship 
highlights this convergence. Nehru and Sukarno were among the most vocal of 
Southern leaders that advanced the Non-Aligned Movement. But would an 
Indonesia, detached from its ASEAN grounding and in closer partnership with 
India, be a possible future scenario? 
 
ASEAN without Indonesia’s pivotal influence is difficult to imagine and Jakarta’s 
continued commitment to the Association is essential for Indonesia’s security and 
                                                59	  See	  also	  (Weatherbee,	  2011).	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prosperity in the region. So long as Jakarta’s regional and global ambitions persist 
the grouping will continue to be the most likely vehicle for their realisation. This 
policy is, moreover, in line with Indonesia’s constitutional discourse and the 
‘million friends diplomacy’ that Indonesia has taken great effort to institutionalise 
across the grouping. Indonesia will continue to play a key role and have 
considerable influence on shaping ASEAN regionalism, notwithstanding domestic 
changes and pressures. Thus far, this influence has provided a positive input to the 
definition of new frameworks and the regional order towards regional peace and 
stability.  
Conclusion	  
I have argued that Indonesia’s foreign policy at the regional and global level is 
motivated by several national role conceptions, which constitute a continuity from 
the country’s constitutional discourse of liberal internationalism, and which are 
dominated by a desire to strengthen Indonesia’s regional leadership status and 
exert more influence on global affairs. The role conception of regional leader and 
global player is advanced on a liberal agenda that is informed by the role 
conceptions of bridge, model/example, regional sub-system collaborator, and 
mediator/integrator. The continuity of Indonesia’s ‘independent and active’ 
foreign policy doctrine is significant as it serves to rationalise Indonesia’s 
engagement in a range of issue areas and geographical contexts, further 
consolidating its credentials as a liberal democracy, a model and a bridge as well 
as “a source for solution” (Sagita, 2013) in the emerging multi-polar world order. 
 
Indonesia’s liberal agenda is not an end in itself, but a means towards realising the 
country’s regional and global ambitions by advancing ASEAN regionalism and 
cohesion. In so doing, Jakarta and other regional proponents of this agenda, such 
as Thailand and the Philippines, have to take into consideration the sensitive and at 
times profound nature of the changes this agenda effects and the potential 
repercussions this might have on ASEAN cohesion. Thus far, despite the 
resistance from several regional governments, considerable progress has been 
made in both policy rhetoric and, arguably, action. Significantly, ASEAN 
mechanisms of security cooperation have also managed to engage rising global 
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power China and its potential nemesis in the region, the U.S. China’s engagement 
is a vital success for Jakarta as it enmeshes Beijing in a regional order bound by 
norms and rules that can diminish the perceived risk of Beijing marginalising 
Jakarta’s standing as regional leader. ASEAN cohesion and further progress in 
regional security cooperation thus is essential for Jakarta to realise this ambition. 
 
Notwithstanding possible domestic political changes in the future, Indonesia’s 
foreign policy behaviour in the region has been marked by continuity since the 
country embarked on its journey towards becoming the world’s largest Muslim-
majority democracy. Jakarta’s desire to build on Indonesia’s ‘international 
identity’, however, at times contradicts its domestic behaviour. Paralleling the 
projection of a liberal democratic order regionally and internationally is a 
resurgence of ethnic strife, regional conflict and religious intolerance in the 
domestic sphere. This trend is evidently not merely a popular one. It further 
extends into Indonesia’s domestic policy sphere, where authoritarian elements 
continue to exert influence. This development does not augur well for Indonesia’s 
nascent democracy if the government fails to adequately respond to these 
challenges. Now, more than ever, is the time to ‘put the house in order’ as the 
central government runs risk of losing sight of its domestic duties and 
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